Question 1

During your oral exam, the examiner asks: 'Your radar shows a clear developing risk of collision, but you assumed the other vessel would give way because it appeared to be the smaller vessel.' What BRM/human-factors concept does this illustrate, and what should the OOW have done differently?

Accepted Answer

This illustrates an assumption overriding the actual COLREGS-based assessment of who is give-way/stand-on — a recognised human-factors trap. The OOW should base the assessment strictly on the Rules (vessel type/situation, not perceived size) and continue monitoring rather than assuming compliance, taking action under Rule 17(a)(ii)/Rule 2 if the other vessel does not appear to be taking appropriate action This links BRM human-factors thinking (unfounded assumptions replacing active assessment) directly to COLREGS application — a classic collision-causation pattern in MAIB findings is exactly this: an officer assumed rather than verified, and continued monitoring/action was not maintained once the assumption was formed.

Question 2

Gard's loss prevention guidance repeatedly highlights that many serious incidents follow a 'normalisation of deviance' — small departures from procedure that become accepted because nothing went wrong before. As Master, what's the most effective way to counter this on board?

Accepted Answer

Actively encourage crew to raise near-misses and procedural drift without fear of blame, and personally follow the same standards you expect of others Gard's guidance on human factors and safety culture identifies normalisation of deviance — where shortcuts that 'worked fine last time' quietly become the new normal — as a precursor to many serious casualties. The most effective defence is an open reporting culture for near-misses and minor deviations, combined with visible leadership from the Master, who sets the tone for what is and isn't acceptable on board.

Question 3

Gard's guidance on near-miss reporting notes that crew sometimes hesitate to report their own minor errors or close calls. As an OOW, why does Gard say this matters for the wider fleet, not just your own ship?

Accepted Answer

Near-miss data, shared and analysed across a fleet (and via schemes like CHIRP Maritime), helps identify recurring risks before they cause a serious incident elsewhere Gard's loss prevention work draws heavily on aggregated near-miss and incident data — including confidential schemes such as CHIRP Maritime — precisely because a near-miss on one vessel is often a warning sign for a hazard that exists across many similar ships. A culture where OOWs report close calls without fear of blame is one of the cheapest and most effective loss-prevention tools available.