Fishing Vessel Safety

Crew Connect Fishing Academy

Real MAIB investigations, worked as decisions rather than case studies. You're the skipper or the deckhand at the actual moment a real crew faced this — what do you do next?

Three pillars

Learn it. Prove you understand it. Prove you can apply it.

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Fishing Safety Knowledge

Stability, weather decision-making, cold-water shock, engine-room single-handed working, the Seafish Safety Folder in practice — one topic at a time, grounded in the Code of Practice for Safety of Fishing Vessels and MAIB's own recurring findings.

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Fishing Competency

Knowledge Checks test whether stability, cold-water physiology and watchkeeping concepts have actually stuck — not just whether you can recall a definition.

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Fishing Decision Simulator

Real incidents, branching decisions, real consequences — recognise a developing list or a fatigued watch, decide, live with what happens next.

Real incident reports

Full write-ups behind three of the scenarios below

Four Minutes — Lexi Rose

A 69-year-old skipper with 40+ years experience, alone, four minutes from propulsion loss to capsize. No PFD.

The Fifth Time — Nista

Back rope entanglement pulled a lone skipper overboard — the fifth near-identical UK creel fatality since 2019.

Lost in 40 Minutes — Weston Bay

A double man overboard during pot shooting exposed no separation from running gear, no drills, and recovery kit that couldn't lift an unconscious casualty.

Decision Simulators

Real fishing-vessel investigations, worked as branching decisions

Every scenario is built from a real MAIB investigation — the opening situation, the decision points, and the real outcome are all drawn from the actual report. Wrong turns show what would genuinely have happened, not an obviously bad choice.

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Njord — The Valve Left Open

A ten-tonne catch, a 10-15 degree list read as good fortune rather than a warning, and an EPIRB left to save the crew instead of a transmitted Mayday.

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Silver Cloud II — The Night Trawl

Three exhausting days, flu-like symptoms, and a lone skipper alone in the wheelhouse at 2330 trusting a watch alarm to do a person's job.

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Louisa — The Last Job Before Bed

A tired crew leaves the deck wash running and a nuisance bilge alarm disabled. Real outcome: three of four crew lost at anchor overnight.

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Ardent II — The Adapter Nobody Checked

An untested multi-socket adapter feeds a mess-room freezer with no smoke detector in the space. A real fire, a real evacuation call, a real constructive total loss.

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Nista — The Fifth Time

A lone creel skipper, an unchecked EPIRB, and a back rope entanglement mechanism that had already killed four other UK fishermen.

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Crystal Stream — The Alarm That Wasn't Connected

A watch alarm nobody had actually tested. A fatigued solo watchkeeper. A real grounding, and a genuine liferaft-survival problem afterward.

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Silver Cloud II — The Watch Nobody Shared

Fatigue and flu symptoms, a watch alarm with no repeater outside the wheelhouse, and a decision to push on rather than call for relief.

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King Challenger — The Way It's Always Done

An unassessed fleet-standard practice, no lifejacket or lifeline, 10.5°C water. Cold-water shock decided the outcome within seconds.

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Sea Harvester — The Pole Kept Rising

A guide-pole rises under strain, twice. The second time, nobody calls stop.

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Jacoba — The Beam Nobody Confirmed

A winch operator who can't see the deckhand working beneath a suspended dredge beam — and no confirmation protocol to close that gap.

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Pauline Mary — No Knife, No Separation

Pot-shooting entanglement risk with no knife at the shooting gate and no separation from the running gear.

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Amadeus — Leaning Over the Rail

Fatigue and posture on the last pot of a long shift — a routine task made hazardous by how tired the deckhand already was.

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Weston Bay — No Separation

A double man overboard during pot deployment exposes a gap between what a "self-shooting" system promises and what it actually delivers.

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Cornishman — The Chain Nobody Checked

A deckhand works beneath a suspended trawl beam against the vessel's own risk assessment — an ageing quick-release chain fails from invisible hydrogen embrittlement.

Boundary

What this is — and isn't

  • A place to rehearse fishing-safety judgement between formal Seafish courses and real trips
  • Grounded in real MAIB investigations, the Code of Practice for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, MSN 1871, and the Seafish Safety Folder
  • Free to use while this section is in active development

Not an approved stability assessment, a substitute for your vessel's own risk assessment or stability information, or a certification provider. Always follow your vessel's own procedures and the Skipper's authority.

Start with a real incident

Louisa — a tired crew, a running deck wash pump, and a bilge alarm someone disabled because it kept going off.

Start the Scenario