Question 1

In one of Gard's four cited cases, radar echoes of the other vessels were visible for over 40 minutes before a collision, but AIS was relied upon instead and the danger wasn't acted on in time. What does this case demonstrate about AIS over-reliance as a bridge management issue, not just a technical one?

Accepted Answer

Having good information available (40 minutes of radar warning) is not the same as that information being acted on — over-reliance on one data source can suppress the response to clear warning signs from another, which is a watchkeeping-discipline and SMS/standing-orders issue as much as a technical one Gard's own recommendation set targets exactly this gap: reinforce lookout and cross-checking practices through the SMS and standing orders, not just individual habit. Available information isn't automatically acted-on information — that gap is where several of these real collisions actually happened, despite the data existing on-screen well before impact.

Question 2

Gard's loss prevention guidance repeatedly highlights that many serious incidents follow a 'normalisation of deviance' — small departures from procedure that become accepted because nothing went wrong before. As Master, what's the most effective way to counter this on board?

Accepted Answer

Actively encourage crew to raise near-misses and procedural drift without fear of blame, and personally follow the same standards you expect of others Gard's guidance on human factors and safety culture identifies normalisation of deviance — where shortcuts that 'worked fine last time' quietly become the new normal — as a precursor to many serious casualties. The most effective defence is an open reporting culture for near-misses and minor deviations, combined with visible leadership from the Master, who sets the tone for what is and isn't acceptable on board.

Question 3

Gard's guidance on near-miss reporting notes that crew sometimes hesitate to report their own minor errors or close calls. As an OOW, why does Gard say this matters for the wider fleet, not just your own ship?

Accepted Answer

Near-miss data, shared and analysed across a fleet (and via schemes like CHIRP Maritime), helps identify recurring risks before they cause a serious incident elsewhere Gard's loss prevention work draws heavily on aggregated near-miss and incident data — including confidential schemes such as CHIRP Maritime — precisely because a near-miss on one vessel is often a warning sign for a hazard that exists across many similar ships. A culture where OOWs report close calls without fear of blame is one of the cheapest and most effective loss-prevention tools available.