Question 1

During your oral exam you are asked: you are the Master and during a routine handover, the outgoing OOW mentions in passing, almost as an afterthought, that "the radar seemed to be acting a bit odd earlier but it's fine now". How do you respond to this handover comment?

Accepted Answer

Ask follow-up questions to understand specifically what was observed (what exactly seemed "odd" — display issues, target dropouts, range/bearing inaccuracies), when it occurred, whether any action was taken, and whether it has been formally tested or simply appeared to resolve itself; an intermittent fault that "fixed itself" without explanation may recur, and a vague handover comment about safety-critical equipment deserves the same level of scrutiny as a formally reported defect Vague, informally-mentioned observations during handovers ("seemed a bit odd", "acting up earlier") are a well-recognised pattern in incident investigations, where a developing equipment fault was noticed by someone but never formally escalated or investigated because it appeared to resolve on its own — intermittent faults are often early indicators of a developing failure that will recur, potentially at a worse time. A good Master treats such comments as worthy of the same investigative rigour as a formal defect report, asking specific questions to understand the nature of the issue, because the casual framing of a comment does not reflect the actual safety significance of a potential radar malfunction, particularly during a watch where radar may be the primary means of collision avoidance.

Question 2

Gard's loss prevention guidance repeatedly highlights that many serious incidents follow a 'normalisation of deviance' — small departures from procedure that become accepted because nothing went wrong before. As Master, what's the most effective way to counter this on board?

Accepted Answer

Actively encourage crew to raise near-misses and procedural drift without fear of blame, and personally follow the same standards you expect of others Gard's guidance on human factors and safety culture identifies normalisation of deviance — where shortcuts that 'worked fine last time' quietly become the new normal — as a precursor to many serious casualties. The most effective defence is an open reporting culture for near-misses and minor deviations, combined with visible leadership from the Master, who sets the tone for what is and isn't acceptable on board.

Question 3

Gard's guidance on near-miss reporting notes that crew sometimes hesitate to report their own minor errors or close calls. As an OOW, why does Gard say this matters for the wider fleet, not just your own ship?

Accepted Answer

Near-miss data, shared and analysed across a fleet (and via schemes like CHIRP Maritime), helps identify recurring risks before they cause a serious incident elsewhere Gard's loss prevention work draws heavily on aggregated near-miss and incident data — including confidential schemes such as CHIRP Maritime — precisely because a near-miss on one vessel is often a warning sign for a hazard that exists across many similar ships. A culture where OOWs report close calls without fear of blame is one of the cheapest and most effective loss-prevention tools available.