Question 1

RISQ Q3.9 checks that bridge manning meets or exceeds the posted Bridge Manning Matrix "at all stages of the voyage and anchor," and notes the OOW may, under STCW, be the sole lookout in daylight in certain circumstances provided this is clearly addressed in the SMS. What is the inspection risk if a vessel's SMS is silent on sole-lookout conditions?

Accepted Answer

Without explicit SMS guidance on when sole lookout is and is not acceptable, individual officers are left to use their own judgement inconsistently — which an inspector will treat as a managed-risk control gap (a Procedures-dimension failure), even if no actual collision or close-quarters situation has occurred during the inspection period STCW permits sole lookout in daylight only in defined circumstances, but leaves the company to specify exactly what those circumstances are within its own SMS — RISQ's guidance explicitly states "clear guidance on the conduct of sole look-out should be included in the SMS." An SMS that simply repeats the STCW permission without defining when it applies has not actually managed the risk, just deferred the decision to whoever is on watch at the time.

Question 2

RISQ Q3.18 asks an inspector to verify ECDIS competency by requesting the Master/watchkeeper to demonstrate live functions (safety settings, voyage plan checks, manual position fixing, CATZOC/SCAMIN knowledge, contingency action for ECDIS failure) rather than simply reviewing a training certificate. Why does the inspection rely on live demonstration over documentary evidence here?

Accepted Answer

A certificate proves training was completed at some point, not that the officer retains functional competence with the specific equipment fitted on this vessel — RightShip's own guidance explicitly lists the functions to be demonstrated in front of the inspector because a paperwork-only check cannot distinguish genuine competence from a forgotten or never-applied skill This mirrors the same Human Factors principle seen in SIRE 2.0: documentary compliance and demonstrable competence are assessed as two separate things. RISQ's own guide to inspection for Q3.18 explicitly lists "basic functionality... in the presence of the inspector" as the verification method — a deliberate design choice, not an inspector preference.

Question 3

RISQ Q3.12 requires the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) to be operational underway AND at anchor, with required tests conducted and recorded. Why does RISQ specifically call out "at anchor" rather than only "underway"?

Accepted Answer

BNWAS exists to detect watchkeeper incapacitation/absence, which is a real risk at anchor as well as underway — anchor watch failures (dragging anchor undetected, drifting into a shipping lane) have caused real casualties, so the alarm's value does not disappear just because the vessel is not making way A common assumption is that watchkeeping risk is purely an underway phenomenon — RISQ's explicit "at anchor" requirement corrects that assumption. An unmonitored anchor watch can fail just as seriously: dragging anchor in worsening weather, traffic encroachment, or a medical incapacitation are all anchor-watch failure modes BNWAS is designed to catch.