Question 1

RISQ Q3.18 asks an inspector to verify ECDIS competency by requesting the Master/watchkeeper to demonstrate live functions (safety settings, voyage plan checks, manual position fixing, CATZOC/SCAMIN knowledge, contingency action for ECDIS failure) rather than simply reviewing a training certificate. Why does the inspection rely on live demonstration over documentary evidence here?

Accepted Answer

A certificate proves training was completed at some point, not that the officer retains functional competence with the specific equipment fitted on this vessel — RightShip's own guidance explicitly lists the functions to be demonstrated in front of the inspector because a paperwork-only check cannot distinguish genuine competence from a forgotten or never-applied skill This mirrors the same Human Factors principle seen in SIRE 2.0: documentary compliance and demonstrable competence are assessed as two separate things. RISQ's own guide to inspection for Q3.18 explicitly lists "basic functionality... in the presence of the inspector" as the verification method — a deliberate design choice, not an inspector preference.

Question 2

RISQ Q3.12 requires the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) to be operational underway AND at anchor, with required tests conducted and recorded. Why does RISQ specifically call out "at anchor" rather than only "underway"?

Accepted Answer

BNWAS exists to detect watchkeeper incapacitation/absence, which is a real risk at anchor as well as underway — anchor watch failures (dragging anchor undetected, drifting into a shipping lane) have caused real casualties, so the alarm's value does not disappear just because the vessel is not making way A common assumption is that watchkeeping risk is purely an underway phenomenon — RISQ's explicit "at anchor" requirement corrects that assumption. An unmonitored anchor watch can fail just as seriously: dragging anchor in worsening weather, traffic encroachment, or a medical incapacitation are all anchor-watch failure modes BNWAS is designed to catch.

Question 3

RISQ Q3.23 asks whether the previous voyage's berth-to-berth passage plan was "comprehensive and approved by the master," with the Guide to Inspection listing route validation stages: visual checks, manual/auto-validation, bridge team cross-checks, final Master authorisation, and re-validation along the route. Why does the Master's authorisation come after, not before, the cross-check stages?

Accepted Answer

The Master's sign-off is meant to be a genuine final check confirming the plan has already survived independent scrutiny by the bridge team, not a rubber-stamp on a plan nobody else has verified — authorising before cross-checks would defeat the purpose of having multiple independent checks in the process This question tests understanding of why a layered verification process is structured the way it is, not just memorisation of the stage names. A Master who authorises a plan before independent cross-checking has occurred is removing the safety value of having multiple people check the same plan — exactly the kind of single-point-of-failure thinking that passage planning audits are designed to surface.

Vetting — RISQ Navigation Practice Questions