A DPO regularly uses an informal workaround (not written in any procedure) to cross-check reference system agreement faster than the standard method allows. How should a Safety-II-minded organisation respond when this comes to light?

A. Ignore it entirely since it has not caused an incident

B. Mandate that all informal practices be banned outright without investigation

C. Discipline the DPO immediately for deviating from the written procedure, regardless of the workaround's merit

D. Investigate why the workaround exists and whether it represents a genuine improvement that should be formalised into procedure, rather than simply disciplining the deviation — work-as-done routinely diverges from work-as-imagined, and the gap is often where real operational knowledge lives

A. Safety-I and Safety-II are simply two names for the same incident investigation method

B. Safety-II only applies to engineering systems, never to human performance

C. Safety-I is the newer model that has fully replaced Safety-II in modern DP guidance

D. Safety-I focuses on identifying and eliminating causes of things going wrong, defining safety as the absence of incidents; Safety-II focuses on understanding how things usually go right despite variability, defining safety as the presence of the capacity to adapt and succeed under varying conditions

A. The distinction is only relevant to shore management, not to the DPO on watch

B. They are identical by definition — procedures always exactly describe what crews actually do

C. "Work-as-done" refers only to maintenance tasks, not watchkeeping

D. "Work-as-imagined" is what procedures, checklists, and management assume happens; "work-as-done" is what actually happens on watch, including the informal adaptations crew make to handle real conditions — gaps between the two are where unrecognised risk and unrecognised good practice both hide