Under a Safety-II approach, what should a DP team do with a shift where nothing went wrong, beyond simply logging it as unremarkable?

A. Nothing — only incidents and near-misses provide useful learning

B. Actively reflect on why it went well — what adaptations, communications, or anticipatory actions the team made that kept normal variability from becoming a problem — and feed that understanding back into training and procedure, rather than treating an uneventful shift as having nothing to learn from

C. Reduce monitoring frequency since the absence of incidents proves the current approach needs no attention

D. Safety-II discourages any review of shifts that went well, focusing exclusively on failures

A. Safety-I and Safety-II are simply two names for the same incident investigation method

B. Safety-II only applies to engineering systems, never to human performance

C. Safety-I is the newer model that has fully replaced Safety-II in modern DP guidance

D. Safety-I focuses on identifying and eliminating causes of things going wrong, defining safety as the absence of incidents; Safety-II focuses on understanding how things usually go right despite variability, defining safety as the presence of the capacity to adapt and succeed under varying conditions

A. The distinction is only relevant to shore management, not to the DPO on watch

B. They are identical by definition — procedures always exactly describe what crews actually do

C. "Work-as-done" refers only to maintenance tasks, not watchkeeping

D. "Work-as-imagined" is what procedures, checklists, and management assume happens; "work-as-done" is what actually happens on watch, including the informal adaptations crew make to handle real conditions — gaps between the two are where unrecognised risk and unrecognised good practice both hide