Under a Safety-II approach, what should a DP team do with a shift where nothing went wrong, beyond simply logging it as unremarkable?

A. Nothing — only incidents and near-misses provide useful learning

B. Reduce monitoring frequency since the absence of incidents proves the current approach needs no attention

C. Actively reflect on why it went well — what adaptations, communications, or anticipatory actions the team made that kept normal variability from becoming a problem — and feed that understanding back into training and procedure, rather than treating an uneventful shift as having nothing to learn from

D. Safety-II discourages any review of shifts that went well, focusing exclusively on failures

A. Safety-I and Safety-II are simply two names for the same incident investigation method

B. Safety-II only applies to engineering systems, never to human performance

C. Safety-I is the newer model that has fully replaced Safety-II in modern DP guidance

D. Safety-I focuses on identifying and eliminating causes of things going wrong, defining safety as the absence of incidents; Safety-II focuses on understanding how things usually go right despite variability, defining safety as the presence of the capacity to adapt and succeed under varying conditions

A. "Work-as-imagined" is what procedures, checklists, and management assume happens; "work-as-done" is what actually happens on watch, including the informal adaptations crew make to handle real conditions — gaps between the two are where unrecognised risk and unrecognised good practice both hide

B. They are identical by definition — procedures always exactly describe what crews actually do

C. "Work-as-done" refers only to maintenance tasks, not watchkeeping

D. The distinction is only relevant to shore management, not to the DPO on watch