Who Can Say Stop? Master, Crew and the Written Limits That Make Stop-Work Real

The Master’s Authority Is Written Into Two Rules

The ISM Code (section 5.2) says the Company should establish in the safety management system that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention, and to request the Company’s help as necessary. SOLAS regulation V/34-1 says the owner, the charterer, the operating company or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the master from taking or executing any decision that, in the master’s professional judgement, is necessary for safe navigation and the protection of the marine environment.

That is the master. What about everyone else? Three recent cases show where authority held and where it did not.

Case 1: A Master Challenges A Sailing Order (IMCA SF 24/20)

A platform supply vessel received sailing orders. All the cargo but one item was for a single platform; the exception was a radioactive container for a second platform. Local dangerous goods rules required the radioactive cargo to be loaded last and dispatched first, and the Master challenged the order. The client’s logistics department rejected the challenge, so the Master escalated it within the company. Management backed him fully and the sailing order was changed. The flash is tagged under the IOGP Life Saving Rule on bypassing safety controls.

What worked: the Master used stop-work authority to require a safe and legal dispatch, and the company had made it clear that he could.

Case 2: Two Masters, Nobody Stopped (IMCA SF 17/26)

During a materials transfer between two vessels moored alongside, weather and sea conditions worsened quickly. One vessel lost heading and position and drifted into the other. The cargo sling was still connected, so neither could move away. They touched at their sterns, with structural damage to both.

IMCA lists the causes as continuing past safe limits despite visibly worsening weather, neither master using their authority to suspend operations when position keeping became marginal, ineffective bridge resource management with slow joint decisions between the two bridges, and a risk assessment with no measurable weather limits to trigger a stop. Its recommendations: define clear operational limits, including weather thresholds; include measurable weather triggers in transfer risk assessments; agree responsibilities and authority before starting any task with several vessels, companies or departments; and make it explicit before work begins that everyone from Masters to deck crew has authority to stop unsafe operations.

Case 3: Authority Held By One Person Who Was Not There (TSIB, VIYADA NAREE)

On VIYADA NAREE the SMS allowed only the ship’s Safety Officer to stop work he reasonably believed could cause a serious accident. The Safety Officer was the Chief Engineer, and he was not at the worksite while three crew freed a jammed crane hook on a platform above the deck. TSIB said it was impractical for him to be present at every operation, and that the policy should authorise any crew member to stop work when an unsafe condition exists. See the full case.

What Makes Stop-Work Real

What To Take Into Your Next Briefing

1. Say aloud who can stop the job. The answer should be everyone.
2. Write down what would make you stop, as a number or an observable.
3. Say who you would call if the stop is questioned.
4. Agree how a restart will be decided.

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Related Reading

• PACE: the escalation framework behind challenge and response
• The hook that would not turn: Viyada Naree
• Seven IMCA Safety Flashes about the bridge team