In hindsight, what passage planning decisions could have prevented this encounter becoming so close and dangerous?

A. Monitoring the Shipping Forecast and naval exercise NOTAMs before departure; slowing to minimum speed in fog and posting a dedicated lookout on the bow; monitoring AIS continuously; considering delaying departure if patchy fog was forecast; making early Ch 16 contact with any traffic detected on radar/AIS

B. A different vessel type would have been seen on radar sooner — the problem was the yacht's small size

C. Russian warships should not be in the English Channel — the problem is political, not navigational

D. The encounter was unavoidable — fog makes all passage planning useless

A. Sounding fog signals (one prolonged blast every 2 min under engine), maintaining a proper radar/lookout, monitoring Ch 16, and reducing speed to minimum steerage way — all required in or near restricted visibility by COLREGs Rule 19

B. Nothing — fog signals are only required at anchor, not underway

C. Maintaining speed and course — you have right of way as a sailing vessel

D. Displaying a radar reflector is sufficient — no sound signals needed for yachts under 20m

A. Go below and call the Coastguard first before attempting any manoeuvre

B. Identify the vessel on AIS if fitted; check radar; try calling on Ch 16 immediately; assess collision risk by checking if the bearing is changing; prepare to take avoiding action under Rule 19

C. Hold course — you have right of way and the warship must give way

D. Tack immediately and sail away at maximum speed — military vessels always have right of way