Question 1

Drawing on the lessons of the Pelican of London investigation, a Chief Officer is reviewing the vessel's own gangway risk assessment and notices it only references 'crew' as the population using the gangway, with no mention of trainees, contractors, or visitors. What should the Chief Officer do?

Accepted Answer

Revise the risk assessment to explicitly include all categories of gangway user (trainees, contractors, visitors, port officials) so that guard ropes, nets, and other controls are assessed against the full range of people actually at risk A risk assessment that only considers experienced crew underestimates the actual risk, since trainees, contractors, and visitors are typically less familiar with the vessel and more likely to misjudge a gangway's hazards — the gap the MAIB identified in the Pelican of London case.

Question 2

In a documented gangway rigging fatality, what procedural gap was identified regarding how the rigging task was normally carried out by the crew?

Accepted Answer

The rigging of the handrail was understood by the crew to be a two-person evolution, but on the day the bosun proceeded with the task essentially alone after sending the deckhand away for life vests An informally understood 'two-person job' is not the same as a documented, enforced procedure — when the second person was sent away mid-task, there was no formal trigger requiring the work to pause until they returned, which connects directly to the lone-working and procedural-documentation gaps covered elsewhere in this module.

Question 3

According to MAIB Safety Digest reporting on pilot ladder deficiencies, what is a 'choke shackle' arrangement, and why is it dangerous?

Accepted Answer

A shackle secured over the ladder's side ropes rather than properly through the designed attachment point, which brings the entire weight of the ladder onto a single step that is not designed to bear that load One of the most common pilot ladder deficiencies identified by MAIB — it looks like a minor rigging shortcut, but it concentrates load on a structural element (a single step) never designed to carry the ladder's full weight, creating a failure point exactly where a pilot or crew member would be standing.