Question 1

A vessel regularly visiting a particular berth has developed an informal team understanding that the current near that specific berth runs noticeably stronger than the published tidal data suggests, due to a local effect not captured in standard references. The team routinely allows extra margin there, though this adjustment exists nowhere in writing. What should be done with this informal knowledge?

Accepted Answer

It should be captured and formalised — added to the vessel's berth-specific notes, passage plan annotations, or pilot briefing materials — so the knowledge survives crew changes and is not lost when the specific individuals who learned it informally move on; this is a clear example of work-as-done (the real, adapted practice) containing valuable knowledge that work-as-imagined (the official documentation) is missing This is a direct, practical example of the work-as-imagined/work-as-done gap — the crew's informal adaptation is genuinely valuable safety knowledge that the official documentation lacks, and losing it through crew turnover (because it was never written down) would be a entirely avoidable loss of hard-won, real operational knowledge.

Question 2

During a berthing approach, an OOW notices a tug line has gone slacker than expected for the current manoeuvre phase and mentions it to the Master, who confirms the tug is repositioning and adjusts the plan slightly to account for the temporary reduced assistance. No incident occurred. What does this exchange demonstrate?

Accepted Answer

The "Monitor" resilience capacity in practice — the OOW noticed a subtle change in a system being relied upon (the tug line) and raised it before it became a problem, allowing the plan to be adjusted proactively rather than reactively; this kind of small, easily-overlooked observation is exactly what Safety-II asks teams to value and reinforce This is a clean example of why Safety-II asks teams to actively study uneventful moments — the value here is entirely in the noticing and the small adjustment, neither of which would appear in an incident log under a Safety-I-only approach, yet both are exactly the behaviour worth deliberately reinforcing.

Question 3

Before unberthing, the Master checks the tidal current tables and notices the current will turn during the planned manoeuvre window, then deliberately adjusts the timing of letting go to avoid the turn happening mid-manoeuvre. The unberthing proceeds smoothly. What resilience capacity does this best illustrate?

Accepted Answer

"Anticipate" — the Master looked ahead at a known, predictable future change (the tide turning) and adjusted the plan before it could interact unfavourably with the manoeuvre, rather than discovering the tide had turned mid-manoeuvre and having to react to it in real time Consulting the tide table is routine, but the deliberate act of using that information to actively reshape the timing of the manoeuvre — rather than just being generally aware of it — is what makes this a genuine example of the Anticipate capacity rather than just box-ticking.