Question 1

The engine room reports the issue was a control system fault on the bridge telegraph link, not an actual engine problem, and that local (engine room) control is available. What does this change about the immediate response?

Accepted Answer

It opens the option of controlling the engine via direct orders relayed to the engine room for local control, rather than relying on the bridge telegraph — this restores some engine control, but with the caveat of slower response time and the need for very clear, unambiguous verbal order relay between bridge and engine room Engine room local control is a genuinely useful fallback, but it is not equivalent to bridge telegraph control in responsiveness or precision — using it requires explicit, careful verbal order discipline, and the Master/OOW must factor in the inherent delay when planning the next manoeuvring step.

Question 2

A single-screw vessel is unberthing, using a spring against slow ahead engine to walk the bow off the berth, with a moderate offshore wind. The engine suddenly fails to respond to an order to go astern. What is the OOW/Master's first action?

Accepted Answer

Immediately inform the engine room directly (not just via telegraph) of the non-response, assess the vessel's current trajectory and what is still controlling it (the spring line, remaining wind effect, any tug), and prepare to use those remaining resources while engine control is investigated — do not wait passively for the engine to respond on a repeated order A non-responsive engine during an unberthing manoeuvre removes a resource the plan was actively relying on — direct communication with the engine room (not just repeating a telegraph order into the void) and an honest reassessment of what control remains is the first priority, exactly as it would be for any sudden loss of an assumed system.

Question 3

With the engine still not responding, the spring line continues to hold the stern while the offshore wind pushes the bow further off the berth than planned, putting more load on the spring than intended. What is the risk now developing?

Accepted Answer

The spring line could be overloaded beyond its safe working load by the combination of wind force and the bow swing, risking it parting under tension — if it parts, the vessel would suddenly lose the one remaining controlling line with no engine available to compensate, and the snap-back risk to anyone near the line increases as load builds This is the developing compound risk that makes this scenario a genuine cascade — the original single fault (engine non-response) is now combining with wind force to threaten a second failure (the spring parting), which would remove the last line of control entirely.