Question 1

The framework notes that "lack of alignment between conclusions of the FMEA and FMEA proving trials" is a common failing, and separately states "only benign failure modes are considered" is another common gap. How do these two failings compound each other in a worst-case scenario?

Accepted Answer

If proving trials only test benign failure modes (failures to an inert/passive state) while the FMEA's conclusions assume coverage of both benign and aggressive failure modes (failures to an active state, like a thruster driving full-power in the wrong direction), the trials programme can appear to "confirm" the FMEA's conclusions while never actually testing the more dangerous aggressive failure scenarios the FMEA was supposed to validate — giving false confidence precisely where the real risk is highest This is precisely why the framework calls these out as distinct, named failings rather than one vague "incomplete testing" category — a trials programme that only ever exercises benign failure modes can look thorough and produce clean results, while systematically never testing the aggressive failure scenarios (the ones genuinely capable of driving a loss of position) that the FMEA's redundancy claims actually depend on.

Question 2

OVID's structure separates the OVPQ (Offshore Vessel Particulars Questionnaire — permanent/semi-permanent vessel features: dimensions, tonnage, crane capabilities, certification) from the OVIQ (the actual inspection questionnaire, completed by the inspector). Why does OVID require the vessel operator to maintain the OVPQ as a separate, standing document rather than having the inspector record all of this information fresh at every inspection?

Accepted Answer

Particulars like dimensions, tonnage, and crane capacity do not change between inspections, so having the operator maintain this as a standing record (which the inspector can verify rather than re-derive from scratch) lets the inspection itself focus its limited time on what actually needs fresh, on-the-spot assessment — current condition, crew competency, operational practice — rather than re-collecting static facts every visit This is a sensible division of labour between a standing-facts document (OVPQ, maintained by the operator) and a point-in-time assessment document (OVIQ, completed by the inspector) — it lets a time-limited inspection focus on what genuinely needs fresh verification rather than re-establishing facts that do not change visit to visit.

Question 3

OVID inspection reports respond to each question with "Yes," "No," "Not Seen," or "Not Applicable" — with "Not Seen" and "Not Applicable" both requiring a stated reason, distinct from a straightforward "No." Why does the OVID reporting structure treat "I could not verify this" as a category requiring its own justification, rather than simply defaulting an unverifiable item to "No"?

Accepted Answer

"No" represents a confirmed negative finding (the item was checked and found deficient), while "Not Seen" represents an inability to verify (e.g. access was restricted, or the relevant operation was not occurring during the inspection window) — collapsing these into one category would make every inspection report ambiguous about whether something was actually wrong or simply not observed, and the required reason for "Not Seen" forces the inspector to document why verification was not possible rather than silently treating absence of evidence as evidence of failure This distinction protects the integrity of the inspection record — a vessel should not be penalised with a confirmed negative finding for an item the inspector genuinely could not observe, but the inspection also should not let unverifiable items disappear silently. Requiring a documented reason for "Not Seen" achieves both: it avoids unfair negative findings while still surfacing exactly which items the report could not actually confirm.