Two guests are swimming off the stern during a swim stop when the yacht begins to drift due to wind/current. One guest struggles to swim back against the drift. As OOW supervising the swim platform, what does this scenario require that differs from a standard crew-falls-overboard MOB drill?

A. GUEST-IN-WATER SCENARIOS — A DISTINCT RISK PROFILE: Unlike a crew member falling from a working deck (a sudden, usually single-casualty event), guest swim stops involve MULTIPLE people deliberately in the water simultaneously, often without lifejackets, with varying swimming ability, and with the vessel itself potentially drifting due to wind/current/no engine — this changes the response: (1) A dedicated lookout/supervisor must be posted at the swim platform for the entire duration guests are in the water — this is a continuous duty, not an occasional check; (2) The vessel's drift must be actively monitored — if the vessel is drifting away from swimmers (rather than swimmers drifting from the vessel), this is functionally a developing MOB situation for every person still in the water, not just the struggling guest; (3) A tender or rescue swimmer should be ready to deploy quickly, since a tired/struggling swimmer in open water can deteriorate fast, especially in any current; (4) Recall/recovery signals and procedures should be briefed to guests BEFORE they enter the water, not improvised once someone is in difficulty; (5) The OOW must be prepared to recall all swimmers immediately (not just rescue the one struggling) if conditions are deteriorating, since other guests in the water are also exposed to the same drift risk. KEY DIFFERENCE FROM CREW MOB: with multiple non-crew, non-briefed people in the water at once, the OOW's situational picture must account for everyone in the water, not a single casualty — a guest swim stop is a higher cognitive-load supervision task than it may appear.

B. Guest swim stops require no different supervision arrangement than a standard MOB drill, since the recovery method (approach, stop, recover) is identical regardless of how many people are in the water.

C. Only the struggling guest needs to be monitored; other swimmers in the water during the same swim stop are not a concern for the OOW supervising the platform.

D. Vessel drift during a swim stop is irrelevant to guest safety provided the engines remain available to be started quickly if needed.

A. Tenders and PWCs are entirely outside the scope of the Large Yacht Code / REG Yacht Code since they are not "the yacht" itself and have no carriage or operational limits.

B. TENDERS AND PWCs UNDER THE CODE — REGULATORY STATUS: Common Annexes to the REG Yacht Code (Annex K1 specifically addresses tenders) set requirements covering tender construction/suitability, launching and recovery arrangements (davits, cranes, garage doors), carriage limits, and operational procedures — tenders are not simply private recreational equipment outside the Code's scope. PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS THIS DRIVES: (1) Tenders used to carry guests must be operated within their certificated/approved passenger capacity, not "however many fit comfortably"; (2) Launch/recovery equipment (davits, cranes) must be inspected, maintained, and operated by trained crew per the manufacturer's and the vessel's SMS procedures — davit failures during launch/recovery are a recognised yacht incident pattern; (3) PWCs (jet skis, etc.) carried for guest use fall under the vessel's safety management and crew supervision responsibilities, including fuel storage/handling on board the mothership; (4) A tender accident (capsize, collision, MOB from a tender) is a vessel safety event requiring the same incident reporting and SMS response as an event on the mothership itself, not a separate "off the books" activity. CREW IMPLICATION: tender operations are an extension of the yacht's safety management system, not an exception to it — informal "everyone knows how it works" practices around tender ops are a genuine compliance and safety gap.

C. Tender regulation under the Code applies only to tenders longer than 24 metres, so virtually no yacht tender is covered by any Code requirement.

D. PWC and tender safety is solely a matter for the manufacturer's user manual, with no requirement for crew training or SMS procedures under the Code.

A. Pre-launch checks are the responsibility of the tender's passengers, not the crew operating the davit.

B. A visual check from a distance is sufficient for routine guest excursions; full checks are only required before the first use of the season.

C. DAVIT PRE-LAUNCH CHECKS — WHY A VISUAL-ONLY CHECK IS INSUFFICIENT: A proper pre-launch check of davit/crane tender-handling equipment should include: (1) Confirming the load limit is not exceeded by the tender plus fuel/equipment/passengers being loaded; (2) Checking wire/strop condition (not just "looks fine" — checking for fraying, corrosion, or kinking that a quick glance can miss); (3) Confirming the hook/release mechanism operates correctly and is not the source of a previous reported defect; (4) Confirming the operator has current training/familiarisation on that specific davit (davit controls and failure modes vary between manufacturers and even between sister yachts); (5) A communication check between the davit operator and anyone in/near the tender during the lift. "IT WAS FINE YESTERDAY" IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE: equipment can develop a defect overnight, a different crew member may load it differently, and load conditions (number of guests, fuel level, sea state alongside) change between uses — a genuine pre-use check is required each time, not a one-off assumption carried forward. The mooring/davit incident pattern across this product's own simulator content already demonstrates that "it worked last time" complacency is a recurring root cause in real equipment failures — the same principle applies directly to tender davits.

D. Davit checks are unnecessary if the tender was successfully recovered without incident on its most recent use.