Question 1

A crew member identifies that a piece of safety equipment does not match what is listed on the safety equipment plan. What is the correct way to handle this under the SMS?

Accepted Answer

Raise it as a non-conformity/observation through the SMS reporting process so it is recorded, investigated, corrected, and — if it reflects a wider issue — used to improve procedures or the safety equipment plan itself The ISM Code requires a system for reporting non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences so they can be analysed and corrective/preventive action taken — quietly fixing an issue without recording it loses this opportunity for systemic improvement.

Question 2

Under the ISM Code and as reinforced in Gard's guidance to Members, the Master's overriding authority to make decisions for the safety of the ship and protection of the environment can be overruled by a commercial instruction from the company, such as a charterer's order to sail on schedule.

Accepted Answer

False False. Gard's guidance to Members consistently stresses that the ISM Code (element 5) gives the Master overriding authority and responsibility for safety and pollution prevention decisions — and that companies must ensure this authority is not undermined by commercial pressure. A charterer's or owner's commercial instruction never overrides the Master's safety judgement; Masters who feel pressured are advised to record their decision and reasoning and report it to the company and, where relevant, to their P&I correspondent.

Question 3

The MAIB's Chief Inspector wrote to Kommandor Susan's owners highlighting the need for "a structured supervision system that provides clear accountability measures" for critical maintenance — none existed at the time of the 2019 overhaul. From a Master's perspective, what role should the SMS (Safety Management System) play in major third-party overhaul work going forward?

Accepted Answer

The SMS should define a structured process for supervising critical maintenance — including superintendent/owner presence during installation of critical components (not just review of paperwork afterward), documented verification of part authenticity, and clear accountability for confirming that what was ordered, delivered and installed all match The MAIB found "a shortfall in oversight and contractor assurance by the vessel owner during the overhaul" and explicitly called for "a structured supervision system that provides clear accountability measures" and systematic monitoring of all critical maintenance work — none of which existed. The lesson is that an SMS that treats major overhauls as a paperwork-review exercise after the fact is missing the point: real-time supervision during installation of safety-critical components (verifying what is actually going in, not just what the invoice says), with clear accountability for that verification, is what the report identifies as missing.