Question 1

In head seas in the Bay of Biscay in winter, the vessel is regularly taking green water over the bow onto the main deck. Describe your management of this situation.

Accepted Answer

GREEN WATER MANAGEMENT — MASTER: Green water (solid water on deck, not spray) is one of the five dangerous situations in MSC.1/Circ.1228 and represents a significant risk to: deck equipment, cargo, crew on deck, and vessel structural integrity. ASSESSMENT: (1) VESSEL SPEED AND COURSE: assess whether reducing speed or altering course reduces the frequency and volume of green water. Head-on into high waves at high speed maximises green water — reducing speed often makes a significant difference; (2) STRUCTURAL RISK: repeated green water impacts transmit massive force to: windlass and anchor equipment; hatch covers (particularly at the forecastle break); forecastle structures; hydraulic pipes and deck equipment. Monitor for structural damage; (3) CARGO LASHINGS: if deck cargo is carried — green water can wash over lashings and create dynamic shock loads far exceeding static design loads. Check all lashings after each sequence of green water events; (4) CREW EXCLUSION: no crew on the fore deck when green water is occurring. Brief the bosun and deck crew — all forward deck work is suspended. If a crew member is swept overboard by green water at night in these conditions — recovery is extremely unlikely; (5) STABILITY EFFECT: green water on deck, if it cannot drain fast enough, represents a free surface effect as it moves across the deck. Ensure freeing ports are clear and draining effectively; (6) SPEED REDUCTION: in most cases, the correct response to green water on the bow is speed reduction — this reduces pitching, reduces the approach speed to each wave, and typically eliminates or reduces green water significantly; (7) LOG: record the sea conditions, the green water incidents, and actions taken. Green water vs spray: the distinction is important. Spray is fine particles of water swept over the bow — it is relatively harmless. Green water is solid, continuous water flooding over the deck with significant volume and weight. Green water at 15 knots carries enormous kinetic energy — capable of bending steel stanchions, ripping off deck equipment, and washing crew overboard. "Bay of Biscay winter" (option B): the Bay of Biscay in winter is notoriously rough. This does not mean green water is "normal" or acceptable. A vessel designed for ocean voyages has structural scantlings that account for heavy weather — but the design provides for reasonable sea conditions, not repeated catastrophic green water loading. Lookout on forecastle (option C): this is a dangerous order. Sending a crew member to the forecastle when green water is occurring puts them in immediate danger of being swept overboard. The forecastle is the first area to be inundated. No person should be on forward deck during green water events. Opening hatch covers (option D): catastrophically wrong. Opening hatch covers in heavy weather when green water is occurring would immediately flood the cargo holds. If hatch cover integrity is suspected — the response is to reduce speed and alter course to reduce the green water frequency while assessing the hatch covers remotely (CCTV if fitted, visual from higher elevation on the bridge). Never open the hatches in these conditions. Freeing ports: SOLAS II-1/22 — freeing ports allow deck water to drain. If freeing ports are blocked (ice, debris), water accumulates on deck. In winter North Atlantic conditions, freeing ports must be kept clear. Ice accretion can block freeing ports rapidly.

Question 2

You are Master of a 35,000 GT bulk carrier in the North Atlantic in a Force 11 storm. The vessel is experiencing heavy slamming and two deck crew have been injured. Speed has been reduced to 5 knots. Charterer is demanding continued passage. What is your command decision?

Accepted Answer

COMMAND DECISION — FORCE 11 HEAVY WEATHER: SOLAS V/34 and ISM Code Section 5.3 give the master OVERRIDING AUTHORITY on safety decisions. The charterer cannot override this. ASSESSMENT: (1) STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY: at 35,000 GT bulk carrier in Force 11 — slamming at 5 knots indicates the vessel is taking green water over the bow. Slamming causes cumulative structural fatigue and can cause hatch cover failure — potentially fatal for a bulk carrier. Inspect hatch covers and deck plating; (2) CREW SAFETY: two crew injured — this is already a safety failure. Continuing in Force 11 with injuries risks further crew harm. The master must cease activities that are causing injury; (3) CARGO INTEGRITY: bulk cargo shift risk in extreme rolling. Check cargo for signs of movement or liquefaction; (4) STABILITY: check the stability situation — in heavy weather, free surface effects from ballast movement and deck water may affect GM; COMMAND OPTIONS: (a) HEAVE-TO: turn the vessel into the sea (head-to-sea or bow slightly off) and reduce speed to minimum steerage. This dramatically reduces slamming and deck cargo stress. The vessel makes minimal progress but safety is maximised; (b) RUN WITH THE SEA: in some sea states, running before the sea at controlled speed reduces slamming but risks broaching; (c) SEEK PORT OF REFUGE: assess the nearest available port of refuge and request entry. The port of refuge decision involves: vessel structural condition; crew condition; weather forecast (will it moderate?); port availability and shelter quality; (4) COMMUNICATION: inform the charterer in writing. State the safety grounds under ISM Section 5.3. Document everything. The charterer's commercial demands do not override the master's safety authority. The command decision in heavy weather is one of the most important tests of professional judgment. It is not binary (proceed vs stop) — it requires a continuous, dynamic assessment. The key factors: (1) structural condition of the vessel; (2) crew safety and welfare; (3) cargo condition; (4) weather forecast; (5) proximity to shelter; (6) vessel's sea-keeping characteristics. Charterer authority (option B): the charterer has NO authority over safety decisions. This is stated explicitly in ISM Section 5.3 and backed by SOLAS V/34. A master who proceeds in conditions causing structural damage and crew injury at the charterer's insistence has abandoned their STCW and ISM responsibilities. The forced heave-to (option C): not necessarily the right decision either. A well-found vessel with experienced crew in open sea may be able to make headway in Force 11. The decision depends on: (a) the vessel's actual condition; (b) the forecast trend; (c) whether heaving-to creates its own hazards (proximity to lee shore, traffic). MAYDAY (option D): Force 11 + slamming + two injuries is NOT automatically a MAYDAY situation. The vessel is navigating and not in immediate danger of sinking. A MAYDAY is appropriate only when the vessel is in imminent danger of sinking or a life is in immediate danger. The correct communication is: UKMTO/MRCC notification if seeking assistance; the passage/condition report to company; MAYDAY only if the situation genuinely becomes life-threatening. Documentation of the command decision: write every assessment, every communication with the charterer, and every action taken in the log. If a formal inquiry follows — this documentation demonstrates the master's professional decision-making.

Question 3

After 36 hours in Force 10-11 conditions, your vessel has shifted cargo and developed a 7° permanent list to starboard. You are 200nm from the Azores. What is your port of refuge decision process?

Accepted Answer

PORT OF REFUGE DECISION — MASTER: A 7° permanent list indicates the centre of gravity has shifted — either cargo movement or flooding. This is a SERIOUS STABILITY SITUATION requiring immediate port of refuge consideration. DECISION PROCESS: (1) ASSESS THE CAUSE: is the list from: (a) Cargo shift (if so — is it getting worse? Can it shift further in continuing heavy weather?); (b) Flooding (is water making its way in?); (c) Free surface from shifted ballast or tank changes? (2) ASSESS THE TREND: is the list stable at 7° or worsening? A stable 7° list may be survivable in moderate conditions. A worsening list in Force 10-11 may lead to capsize; (3) STABILITY CALCULATION: run the loadicator with the assumed shifted cargo weight and position. What is the current effective GM? What is the righting arm (GZ) at current heel? Does the vessel have adequate stability reserve?; (4) WEATHER FORECAST: will the storm moderate within 6-12 hours? If yes — can the vessel safely ride it out? If no or uncertain — proceed to port of refuge; (5) ASSESS THE REFUGE PORT: (a) Can the Azores (Horta, Terceira) receive a vessel with 7° list in the current sea state? (b) Is there adequate shelter in the port? (c) Can cargo be restowed there? (d) Is a tug available for assistance if manoeuvring is compromised by the list?; (6) DECLARATION TO COASTAL STATE: contact the Portuguese maritime authority (MRCC Delgada) — request port of refuge entry. Provide vessel condition, stability status, list, cargo shift; (7) PAN PAN: in a vessel with compromised stability, transmit a PAN PAN (urgency) signal. This alerts maritime authorities without the formality of MAYDAY. 7° list from cargo shift: this is a serious situation requiring IMMEDIATE action — but not necessarily abandon ship. The master's response must be measured and analytical. At 7° list, the vessel's GZ curve has been shifted. The question is: what is the residual stability reserve? A vessel with 1.5m GM shifted to 7° may have adequate reserve. A vessel with 0.3m GM shifted to 7° is dangerously close to capsizing. The loadicator gives this answer. The worsening trend: if the list is worsening (was 3°, now 7°, still rolling heavily) — immediate port of refuge is required. The cargo will continue to shift in heavy weather until equilibrium at the new angle or until the vessel capsizes. 7° being "manageable" (option B): depends entirely on the stability reserve. This is not a generic answer — it requires calculation. Oral examiners want to see that the master uses the loadicator and makes a data-driven decision, not a "seems OK" assessment. Abandon ship (option C): premature. A 7° list in heavy weather is dangerous but not necessarily a capsizing situation. Abandoning ship in Force 10-11 seas is enormously dangerous — survival craft in these conditions have capsized. The master does not abandon the vessel unless the remaining-on-board option is worse than abandonment. Counter-ballasting (option D): this addresses the list symptom but not the cause. If the cargo has shifted — adding starboard ballast may correct the list angle but it adds weight and reduces freeboard. In continuing heavy weather, the cargo may shift further, making the next correction impossible. The longer-term solution is port of refuge and cargo restowage.