Question 1

The crew need to chip and paint the funnel, which is 12 metres above the main deck. A ship's basket bosun's chair will be used. As Chief Mate, describe the risk assessment and permit-to-work process.

Accepted Answer

WORKING AT HEIGHT — FUNNEL PAINTING RISK ASSESSMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK: UK HSWA 1974 (and COSWP Chapter 21 — Working at Height). Risk assessment and permit-to-work are required for ANY work at height (>2m above a safe surface in most applications; or any height where a fall could cause injury). RISK ASSESSMENT FACTORS: (1) HEIGHT: 12m above main deck — falls from this height are FATAL. Fall distance = the primary risk factor; (2) EQUIPMENT CONDITION: inspect the bosun's chair: (a) check the seat condition (no fraying, no damage to the sling); (b) check the block and tackle or winch used to raise/lower; (c) check the lifeline/safety harness that clips the worker to the structure independently of the bosun's chair; (3) WEATHER: wind speed — above 15 knots, the bosun's chair becomes increasingly difficult to control. A 12m pendulum swing in a funnel gap is dangerous. Establish maximum acceptable wind speed and check forecast; (4) COMMUNICATION: worker at height and person tending the line on deck must have continuous communication (walkie-talkie or clear voice contact); (5) EXCLUSION ZONE: below the work area — establish an exclusion zone to prevent injury from falling tools or paint cans; (6) PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT: hard hat, safety harness with independent lifeline, non-slip footwear; PERMIT-TO-WORK: (7) Chief mate signs the permit specifying: maximum wind speed, equipment checks, PPE required, communication plan, exclusion zone, number of persons; (8) Chief mate or bosun must OBSERVE the setup before authorising start of work. Bosun's chair risk: working in a bosun's chair at 12m is classified as high-risk work in every maritime safety framework. COSWP Chapter 21 specifically requires: (a) risk assessment; (b) PTW; (c) double lifeline/harness independent of the chair; (d) weather limit. The primary cause of bosun's chair fatalities is either the chair/sling failing or the worker not wearing/improperly wearing the independent safety harness. The independent harness ensures that if the chair itself fails — the worker is still secured. Scaffold for funnel painting: on a vessel at sea, scaffolding is generally impractical for funnel work. The traditional methods are bosun's chair, rope access (certified industrial rope access operatives), or a portable scaffold platform hung from the funnel top. None of these eliminate the PTW requirement — they change the risk profile and require different controls. Chief mate vs master signing permit: PTW systems vary by company SMS. In most SMS designs, the chief mate signs permits for deck work (including working at height), the chief engineer signs for engine room permits, and the master countersigns high-risk permits. "Only the master can sign" (option C) is generally too restrictive — this would paralyse routine maintenance operations when the master is occupied. The SMS defines who can authorise which level of risk. Weather limits for funnel painting: a key practical point. The permit should specify a maximum wind speed (typically Beaufort 3-4 = 12-20 knots) above which work must stop. If work is ongoing at sea and weather deteriorates — the chief mate must be notified and the PTW revoked until conditions improve.

Question 2

At sea, the engine room unmanned machinery space (UMS) fire detection alarm sounds in the wheelhouse. As Chief Mate, describe your systematic response before activating the fixed CO2 system.

Accepted Answer

ENGINE ROOM FIRE — CHIEF MATE's RESPONSE: THIS IS A HIGH-STAKES DECISION — CO2 CANNOT BE RECALLED. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: (1) GENERAL ALARM: sound general alarm — crew to muster stations; (2) STOP ENGINE ROOM VENTILATION: close all engine room ventilation fans and dampers. This starves the fire of fresh oxygen. Localised fires that are pre-flashover can be extinguished by ventilation isolation alone. Do NOT stop ventilation too late — allow time for air cutoff before CO2 activation; (3) FUEL CUT-OFF: stop fuel supply to the main engine and all auxiliary engines (switch to emergency generator); (4) PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY: confirm ALL engineering crew are out of the engine room. NO-ONE MUST BE IN THE ENGINE ROOM WHEN CO2 IS RELEASED. Activate the CO2 only when you are 100% certain the space is clear; (5) VERIFY THE FIRE: a CO2 activation on a false alarm is at minimum a serious expense and out-of-service period. If possible (without opening access), use the smoke detector display to identify which zone is activated; (6) PRE-ACTIVATION CHECKS: (a) Close all E/R ventilation; (b) Close all fuel lines; (c) Stop all rotating machinery (if possible remotely); (d) Headcount confirmed — ALL personnel clear; (e) Close all doors, hatches, skylights to the engine room; (7) ACTIVATE CO2: from the remote release station. Announce "CO2 RELEASE, DO NOT ENTER ENGINE ROOM" on PA; (8) DO NOT OPEN E/R FOR AT LEAST 10 MINUTES: allow CO2 to flood and smother the fire; (9) NOTIFY: master, coastguard if required, company. CO2 SOLAS requirements: SOLAS II-2 Regulation 10 requires vessels of certain sizes to have a fixed CO2 fire suppression system in the engine room. The FSS Code (Fire Safety Systems Code) specifies the CO2 quantity required (at least 40% of the gross volume of the protected space). Pre-activation headcount requirement: this is non-negotiable and is the single most important step before CO2 activation. CO2 at the concentration required for fire suppression (34%+ CO2) is immediately lethal within minutes. Several fatalities have occurred globally when CO2 was released into spaces where personnel were still present. The ISM Code, FSS Code, and SOLAS II-2/10 all implicitly require a headcount before activation. Immediate opening (option B): opening the engine room to fight a fire manually when the room is already filling with smoke and the UMS alarm has sounded — is extremely dangerous. The engine room atmosphere may contain: carbon monoxide, unburnt fuel vapour, heated air above 60°C. Personnel entering without SCBA face immediate risk. The correct response is to assess the fire severity, attempt ventilation cutoff, and if the fire is significant — activate the fixed system. Immediate CO2 without checks (option C): the danger is activating CO2 with personnel still in the engine room. Speed is important — but not at the cost of human life. The checklist (fans, fuel, headcount, doors) takes 2-3 minutes and must be completed before activation. Chief engineer authority (option D): the master, chief officer, and other senior officers are all trained to operate emergency fire suppression systems. In an emergency, the chief mate must be capable of and authorised to activate the CO2 system. The chief engineer's authority extends to engine room operations under normal circumstances — not to emergency decisions that require immediate action.

Question 3

A galley fire has been extinguished. One crew member has burns and the galley is damaged. As Chief Mate, describe the post-fire actions.

Accepted Answer

POST-FIRE ACTIONS — CHIEF MATE: IMMEDIATE CARE: (1) CASUALTY CARE: the burned crew member — burns treatment from the Ship Captain's Medical Guide: (a) cool the burn with cool running water for 20 minutes (do not use ice); (b) DO NOT burst blisters, remove clothing stuck to burn, or apply creams; (c) Cover with cling film (or clean non-fluffy material) loosely; (d) Assess burn area (Rule of Nines for body surface area); (e) Contact TMAS for guidance and assess need for medevac (burns >10% BSA, face/hands/genitals, circumferential burns — all warrant medevac); SCENE MANAGEMENT: (2) DO NOT DISTURB the scene more than necessary. If MAIB investigation may occur — preserve the scene; (3) PHOTOGRAPH: take photographs of the damage before cleanup begins; (4) IDENTIFY THE SEAT OF THE FIRE: where did the fire start? What was the fuel source? This is important for: (a) future prevention; (b) MAIB/insurance investigation; MAIB NOTIFICATION: (5) MAIB Regulations 2012 — is this reportable? A galley fire with one crew member burned = potentially a "serious injury" (definition: burns covering >10% of BSA, or burns to face/hands). If the burned crew member's burns are serious — REPORT IMMEDIATELY (023 8023 2527). Even if burns are minor — a fire causing significant vessel damage may be reportable. When in doubt — notify MAIB; (6) COMPANY NOTIFICATION: DPA immediately; (7) ISM NON-CONFORMITY: file a full non-conformity report in the SMS; (8) INSURANCE: notify H&M insurers (via owner) for vessel damage; P&I for crew injury. CORRECTIVE ACTION: (9) What caused the fire? Was the deep fat fryer thermostat faulty? Was the galley left unattended? Was there a failure of fire suppression? Address root cause before the galley recommences operation. Burns first aid — cool water only: the universally accepted first aid for burns is cool running water for at least 20 minutes. This removes heat from the tissue and reduces burn depth. Butter, cooking oil, toothpaste, and any other home remedies are specifically contraindicated — they retain heat, introduce infection risk, and interfere with medical assessment. TMAS burn assessment: TMAS will guide the chief mate on assessing burn severity and whether medevac is required. Key assessment criteria: (a) extent (percentage body surface area burned — use Wallace Rule of Nines); (b) depth (superficial/partial/full thickness); (c) location (face, hands, genitals — always warrant hospital assessment); (d) inhalation injury (hoarseness, singed nasal hairs, carbonaceous sputum — very serious). MAIB reporting — galley fire threshold: MAIB Regulations 2012 Schedule 1 defines "serious marine incidents" including: "a fire... or any other incident causing material damage to a United Kingdom ship or to a ship in United Kingdom waters." A galley fire causing significant damage to the galley structure may meet this threshold. Report and let MAIB decide whether to investigate. Scene preservation: post-fire scene preservation is critical for insurance and investigation purposes. The seat of the fire, the path of fire travel, and the damage pattern are all evidence that allows investigators to determine origin and cause. Cleaning immediately destroys this evidence. The insurance surveyor and MAIB investigator need to see the scene as it was post-fire. Galley fire common causes: the most common galley fire causes are unattended cooking (especially deep fat fryers — these should have automatic thermostatic controls and a fire blanket immediately available), and grease-clogged extract ductwork which ignites and propagates fire through the ventilation system.