Question 1

As Chief Mate responsible for LSA maintenance, describe the inspection programme you implement for the vessel's totally enclosed lifeboats.

Accepted Answer

LIFEBOAT INSPECTION PROGRAMME — CHIEF MATE: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: SOLAS III/36 (Inspection and Maintenance of Survival Craft) and the associated MSC.1/Circ.1432 (guidelines on maintenance and inspection of survival craft launching appliances). The LSA Code specifies the operational requirements for survival craft. INSPECTION SCHEDULE: (1) WEEKLY: (a) Visual inspection of lifeboat exterior — damage, condition of glass reinforced plastic hull; (b) Check davit system — no obvious mechanical defects; (c) Check hook/tripping mechanism — release line free and correctly rigged; (d) Check emergency lights are functioning; (e) Check hydrostatic release unit (HRU) is correctly attached to buoyancy aid and float-free arrangement; (2) MONTHLY: (a) Check engine — fuel level, starting battery, brief run if practical; (b) Check all equipment on inventory list (Ship Captain's Medical Guide, pyrotechnics — expiry dates, food and water stores — check quantity and expiry); (c) Check launching davit — lubricate wire if needed, check limit switches; (d) Check hooks (on-load release — do not release while weight is on it); (3) ANNUAL (with Manufacturer/Approved Service Provider): (a) Full lifeboat service by accredited technician; (b) Load test of davit wire; (c) Check inflatable lifejackets/MES (Marine Evacuation System if fitted); (4) 5-YEARLY: full inspection including hydrostatic test of compressed air breathing apparatus; (5) PYROTECHNICS: check expiry dates on all flares and smoke signals every 3 months. Replace any items within 12 months of expiry (some items must be replaced before expiry — check SOLAS III provisions). MSC.1/Circ.1432 — SOLAS III/36: SOLAS III/36 requires a maintenance programme for survival craft. MSC.1/Circ.1432 (2009) specifically revised guidance after a series of lifeboat-related accidents globally, including the loss of life in on-load hook failures and crushing accidents during lifeboat drills. MSC.1/Circ.1432 strongly recommends that annual lifeboat servicing is performed by the manufacturer's trained and approved service providers — not by ship's crew. Hydrostatic release unit (HRU): the HRU automatically releases the lifeboat's securing arrangement if the vessel sinks and the lifeboat is still in its cradle — allowing the lifeboat to float free. The HRU has an expiry date (typically 2 years) and must be replaced before expiry. Failure to replace an expired HRU is a detainable PSC deficiency. On-load hook danger: on-load release hooks (SOLAS III/41.7) have been implicated in numerous lifeboat accidents where the hook released accidentally when the lifeboat was being boarded in a swell or when the crew inadvertently triggered the release mechanism. MSC.1/Circ.1392 provided instructions for improved hook maintenance and testing procedures. The hook should NEVER be released while persons are in the lifeboat and it is not fully waterborne. Chief mate authority over lifeboat maintenance: the chief mate is typically the ship's safety officer and bears primary responsibility for the condition of all LSA on board. Annual drydock inspection does not replace the ongoing maintenance programme. A lifeboat with a flat battery, expired pyrotechnics, or a seized davit wire between drydocks is a SOLAS deficiency regardless of when the last drydock was.

Question 2

At sea, the engine room unmanned machinery space (UMS) fire detection alarm sounds in the wheelhouse. As Chief Mate, describe your systematic response before activating the fixed CO2 system.

Accepted Answer

ENGINE ROOM FIRE — CHIEF MATE's RESPONSE: THIS IS A HIGH-STAKES DECISION — CO2 CANNOT BE RECALLED. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: (1) GENERAL ALARM: sound general alarm — crew to muster stations; (2) STOP ENGINE ROOM VENTILATION: close all engine room ventilation fans and dampers. This starves the fire of fresh oxygen. Localised fires that are pre-flashover can be extinguished by ventilation isolation alone. Do NOT stop ventilation too late — allow time for air cutoff before CO2 activation; (3) FUEL CUT-OFF: stop fuel supply to the main engine and all auxiliary engines (switch to emergency generator); (4) PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY: confirm ALL engineering crew are out of the engine room. NO-ONE MUST BE IN THE ENGINE ROOM WHEN CO2 IS RELEASED. Activate the CO2 only when you are 100% certain the space is clear; (5) VERIFY THE FIRE: a CO2 activation on a false alarm is at minimum a serious expense and out-of-service period. If possible (without opening access), use the smoke detector display to identify which zone is activated; (6) PRE-ACTIVATION CHECKS: (a) Close all E/R ventilation; (b) Close all fuel lines; (c) Stop all rotating machinery (if possible remotely); (d) Headcount confirmed — ALL personnel clear; (e) Close all doors, hatches, skylights to the engine room; (7) ACTIVATE CO2: from the remote release station. Announce "CO2 RELEASE, DO NOT ENTER ENGINE ROOM" on PA; (8) DO NOT OPEN E/R FOR AT LEAST 10 MINUTES: allow CO2 to flood and smother the fire; (9) NOTIFY: master, coastguard if required, company. CO2 SOLAS requirements: SOLAS II-2 Regulation 10 requires vessels of certain sizes to have a fixed CO2 fire suppression system in the engine room. The FSS Code (Fire Safety Systems Code) specifies the CO2 quantity required (at least 40% of the gross volume of the protected space). Pre-activation headcount requirement: this is non-negotiable and is the single most important step before CO2 activation. CO2 at the concentration required for fire suppression (34%+ CO2) is immediately lethal within minutes. Several fatalities have occurred globally when CO2 was released into spaces where personnel were still present. The ISM Code, FSS Code, and SOLAS II-2/10 all implicitly require a headcount before activation. Immediate opening (option B): opening the engine room to fight a fire manually when the room is already filling with smoke and the UMS alarm has sounded — is extremely dangerous. The engine room atmosphere may contain: carbon monoxide, unburnt fuel vapour, heated air above 60°C. Personnel entering without SCBA face immediate risk. The correct response is to assess the fire severity, attempt ventilation cutoff, and if the fire is significant — activate the fixed system. Immediate CO2 without checks (option C): the danger is activating CO2 with personnel still in the engine room. Speed is important — but not at the cost of human life. The checklist (fans, fuel, headcount, doors) takes 2-3 minutes and must be completed before activation. Chief engineer authority (option D): the master, chief officer, and other senior officers are all trained to operate emergency fire suppression systems. In an emergency, the chief mate must be capable of and authorised to activate the CO2 system. The chief engineer's authority extends to engine room operations under normal circumstances — not to emergency decisions that require immediate action.

Question 3

A galley fire has been extinguished. One crew member has burns and the galley is damaged. As Chief Mate, describe the post-fire actions.

Accepted Answer

POST-FIRE ACTIONS — CHIEF MATE: IMMEDIATE CARE: (1) CASUALTY CARE: the burned crew member — burns treatment from the Ship Captain's Medical Guide: (a) cool the burn with cool running water for 20 minutes (do not use ice); (b) DO NOT burst blisters, remove clothing stuck to burn, or apply creams; (c) Cover with cling film (or clean non-fluffy material) loosely; (d) Assess burn area (Rule of Nines for body surface area); (e) Contact TMAS for guidance and assess need for medevac (burns >10% BSA, face/hands/genitals, circumferential burns — all warrant medevac); SCENE MANAGEMENT: (2) DO NOT DISTURB the scene more than necessary. If MAIB investigation may occur — preserve the scene; (3) PHOTOGRAPH: take photographs of the damage before cleanup begins; (4) IDENTIFY THE SEAT OF THE FIRE: where did the fire start? What was the fuel source? This is important for: (a) future prevention; (b) MAIB/insurance investigation; MAIB NOTIFICATION: (5) MAIB Regulations 2012 — is this reportable? A galley fire with one crew member burned = potentially a "serious injury" (definition: burns covering >10% of BSA, or burns to face/hands). If the burned crew member's burns are serious — REPORT IMMEDIATELY (023 8023 2527). Even if burns are minor — a fire causing significant vessel damage may be reportable. When in doubt — notify MAIB; (6) COMPANY NOTIFICATION: DPA immediately; (7) ISM NON-CONFORMITY: file a full non-conformity report in the SMS; (8) INSURANCE: notify H&M insurers (via owner) for vessel damage; P&I for crew injury. CORRECTIVE ACTION: (9) What caused the fire? Was the deep fat fryer thermostat faulty? Was the galley left unattended? Was there a failure of fire suppression? Address root cause before the galley recommences operation. Burns first aid — cool water only: the universally accepted first aid for burns is cool running water for at least 20 minutes. This removes heat from the tissue and reduces burn depth. Butter, cooking oil, toothpaste, and any other home remedies are specifically contraindicated — they retain heat, introduce infection risk, and interfere with medical assessment. TMAS burn assessment: TMAS will guide the chief mate on assessing burn severity and whether medevac is required. Key assessment criteria: (a) extent (percentage body surface area burned — use Wallace Rule of Nines); (b) depth (superficial/partial/full thickness); (c) location (face, hands, genitals — always warrant hospital assessment); (d) inhalation injury (hoarseness, singed nasal hairs, carbonaceous sputum — very serious). MAIB reporting — galley fire threshold: MAIB Regulations 2012 Schedule 1 defines "serious marine incidents" including: "a fire... or any other incident causing material damage to a United Kingdom ship or to a ship in United Kingdom waters." A galley fire causing significant damage to the galley structure may meet this threshold. Report and let MAIB decide whether to investigate. Scene preservation: post-fire scene preservation is critical for insurance and investigation purposes. The seat of the fire, the path of fire travel, and the damage pattern are all evidence that allows investigators to determine origin and cause. Cleaning immediately destroys this evidence. The insurance surveyor and MAIB investigator need to see the scene as it was post-fire. Galley fire common causes: the most common galley fire causes are unattended cooking (especially deep fat fryers — these should have automatic thermostatic controls and a fire blanket immediately available), and grease-clogged extract ductwork which ignites and propagates fire through the ventilation system.