Your heavily laden tanker has a crack in a cargo tank and is leaking HFO into the sea 40nm off the French coast. Port access is being refused. What are your rights and who do you contact?

A. PORT OF REFUGE REFUSAL — Master's rights and contacts: (1) IMO GUIDELINES: IMO Resolution A.949(23) — Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance. A ship in distress has a recognised need for a place of refuge. However, port states retain sovereign discretion to grant or refuse access; (2) CONTACTS: (a) MRCC Gris-Nez (France — VHF Ch 16, also monitoring on satellite); (b) French Maritime Prefect (Préfet Maritime) — the national authority for ports of refuge decisions in France; (c) UK Flag State (MCA) — the flag state has a responsibility to support its vessels; the MCA will contact French authorities directly; (d) Company / P&I Club — the P&I Club (ITOPF — International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation) can assist with pollution response resources and negotiations with coastal authorities; (3) P&I FUNDING: offer of security for potential pollution cleanup costs often unlocks port of refuge access — coastal authorities are more willing to accept a vessel if they have financial guarantees; (4) WRECK REMOVAL INSURANCE: the P&I Club confirms to French authorities the vessel is covered for wreck removal and pollution cleanup; (5) ESCALATION: if France refuses and the UK flag state cannot negotiate access — IMO Secretary-General can be engaged (though this is slow); (6) SALVAGE: engage a salvor under LOF — the salvor may be able to negotiate port access as part of the LOF terms.

B. A coastal state has the absolute right to refuse entry — there is no international mechanism to challenge a port of refuge refusal. Accept the denial and continue at sea.

C. Declare a MAYDAY and proceed to port at full speed. Coastal authorities cannot block a vessel that has transmitted a MAYDAY — maritime emergency overrides port entry rules.

D. Anchor in French territorial waters. Coastal states cannot remove a vessel that is anchored in distress within their territorial sea.

A. ABANDON SHIP DECISION — command analysis: (1) FACTORS FOR IMMEDIATE ABANDON: fire has breached CO2 total flooding — the fixed system has failed; structural integrity now at risk; uncontrolled fire progression; water temperature 6°C limits survival time to approximately 30-60 minutes — the sooner into the water, the more daylight/SAR time available; (2) FACTORS AGAINST IMMEDIATE ABANDON: night-time, North Atlantic, Force 7-8 conditions — launching lifeboats in these conditions is extremely hazardous and may itself cause casualties; is there a safe refuge (citadel/fire boundary not yet breached); is a SAR helicopter or vessel ETA within 30-60 minutes (survival time in 6°C water); (3) DECISION FRAMEWORK: the master makes this call balancing the risk of remaining (growing fire) against the risk of abandonment (cold water, sea conditions). International guideline (IAMSAR/IMO Resolution): abandon ship when the vessel can no longer be considered a safe platform. In this scenario — uncontrolled fire with CO2 failure and structural risk = abandon; (4) TIMING: ensure EPIRB is activated, MAYDAY is sent, lifeboat/raft is ready BEFORE giving the order — do not order abandon before the means of abandonment are ready; (5) POSTMASTER'S AUTHORITY: no one else can give the order to abandon ship; the master does not wait for the company's permission — ISM Ch 5.2 expressly states the master's overriding authority on safety.

B. Never abandon ship at night in Force 7 conditions. Wait until daylight and improved conditions before giving the abandon ship order regardless of the fire severity.

C. Call the company for authorisation before abandoning ship. The ISM Code requires management approval for the decision to abandon.

D. The Chief Officer makes the abandon ship decision — the master should remain on the bridge to coordinate communications with the coast guard until the last moment.

A. COMMERCIAL PRESSURE vs SAFETY — Master's authority: (1) GM ASSESSMENT: 0.25m GM with containers and a Force 9 forecast must be assessed against the IS Code minimum (0.15m) AND the practical performance of the vessel in Force 9 (7-10m seas). While 0.25m exceeds the IS Code minimum, it provides very limited stability reserve in severe conditions with heavy rolling. A stability improvement should be sought — low ballasting, removal of topweight — before departure; (2) MASTER'S AUTHORITY: SOLAS V Rule 34.3 — the master's judgement on safety shall not be overridden by the owner, charterer, or any other person. ISM Code Ch 5.2 — overriding authority explicitly confirmed; (3) LEGAL POSITION: if the master departs under commercial pressure with an inadequate GM and the vessel capsizes, the master faces criminal negligence charges (MSA 1995 s.58 — operating in an unsafe manner). "I was told to go" is not a defence; (4) COMMUNICATION: document all communications — email/telex the charterer stating the reasons for delay and the decision. This creates an evidence trail; notify the company and DPA of the commercial pressure and safety concern; (5) STCW VIII/2: the master has the right to make decisions for the safety of the vessel and crew without interference; (6) DECISION: do not depart. Improve stability first. Reassess the departure weather window.

B. Depart as demanded. The charterer bears responsibility for any voyage where they demand departure — the master is indemnified by complying with charterer instructions.

C. Compromise: depart with the current stability but reduce speed to 5 knots. This reduces rolling and compensates for the low GM.

D. SOLAS stability criteria apply only to the departure condition. Once at sea, weather conditions may change and reduce the risk — the departure decision is solely commercial.