Question 1

Your vessel is transiting the Gulf of Aden. A skiff with armed persons is approaching rapidly from 4nm at 25 knots. You are at 14 knots. BMP guidance is in force. What are your command decisions?

Accepted Answer

PIRACY RESPONSE — BMP6 and command decisions: (1) HIGH RISK AREA PREPARATION (should already be done): citadel prepared and stocked (food, water, communications, independent satellite phone); razor wire rigged on rails; fire hoses rigged and pressurised; crew briefed on muster to citadel; all external access points secured; SSAS tested; (2) ALERT: sound ship's alarm; muster crew — direct all non-essential crew to the citadel immediately; (3) SPEED: apply maximum power — best speed; confirm engine room on maximum revolutions; alter course if necessary to put the skiff on the quarter and increase the chase range; (4) EVASIVE MANOEUVRING: if skiff closes to within 2nm — hard manoeuvring to present the stern; use stern wash to swamp the skiff; (5) COMMUNICATIONS: SSAS activation (covert alert to flag state); notify UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, Dubai) on VHF/satellite; VHF Ch 16 distress; (6) RAZOR WIRE AND FIRE HOSES: crew activate fire hoses covering all accessible boarding points; (7) CITADEL: if boarding is imminent and cannot be prevented — ALL crew muster in the citadel; master last in; seal the citadel; (8) DO NOT RESIST ARMED BOARDERS: once armed persons are aboard — crew must not resist; lives are the priority. BMP (Best Management Practices) — currently BMP6 (2023) — is produced by BIMCO, ICS, and other maritime industry bodies and endorsed by the IMO and naval coalition forces (CMF — Combined Maritime Forces). BMP6 is the authoritative guide for piracy prevention in High Risk Areas (HRA). The citadel concept: a hardened room, typically deep in the vessel and protected from direct weapons fire, where the crew take refuge if boarding cannot be prevented. The citadel must have: independent satellite communications (to contact UKMTO and the navy even if the bridge is taken); food and water for 72+ hours; medical supplies. Once crew are in the citadel and the vessel is drifting/stopped: naval forces can locate and respond to the SSAS alert and recover the crew. UKMTO: the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre in Dubai is the 24/7 contact point for vessels in the HRA. Reporting position reports every 4 days (or on any change of plan) to UKMTO allows them to track vessels and respond quickly to distress. Option D (arm the crew): while some jurisdictions permit armed security teams aboard, crew arming with improvised weapons is specifically NOT recommended by BMP — it increases the risk of crew injury from armed pirates who are typically better armed and more experienced. Professionally armed Maritime Security Guards (MSGs) under a flag state-approved plan are a different matter.

Question 2

Fire in the engine room is spreading to the accommodation. CO2 has been released but flames are visible through the starboard side of the ship. It is 0200 in the North Atlantic, water temperature 6°C. Do you abandon ship? What factors govern your decision?

Accepted Answer

ABANDON SHIP DECISION — command analysis: (1) FACTORS FOR IMMEDIATE ABANDON: fire has breached CO2 total flooding — the fixed system has failed; structural integrity now at risk; uncontrolled fire progression; water temperature 6°C limits survival time to approximately 30-60 minutes — the sooner into the water, the more daylight/SAR time available; (2) FACTORS AGAINST IMMEDIATE ABANDON: night-time, North Atlantic, Force 7-8 conditions — launching lifeboats in these conditions is extremely hazardous and may itself cause casualties; is there a safe refuge (citadel/fire boundary not yet breached); is a SAR helicopter or vessel ETA within 30-60 minutes (survival time in 6°C water); (3) DECISION FRAMEWORK: the master makes this call balancing the risk of remaining (growing fire) against the risk of abandonment (cold water, sea conditions). International guideline (IAMSAR/IMO Resolution): abandon ship when the vessel can no longer be considered a safe platform. In this scenario — uncontrolled fire with CO2 failure and structural risk = abandon; (4) TIMING: ensure EPIRB is activated, MAYDAY is sent, lifeboat/raft is ready BEFORE giving the order — do not order abandon before the means of abandonment are ready; (5) POSTMASTER'S AUTHORITY: no one else can give the order to abandon ship; the master does not wait for the company's permission — ISM Ch 5.2 expressly states the master's overriding authority on safety. The abandon ship decision is the most consequential decision a master can make. It is never simple — remaining on a burning vessel has killed crews; premature abandonment in severe sea conditions has also killed crews. Real examples: the El Faro (2015) — the master chose not to abandon in time, partly due to company communication dynamics, with the loss of all 33 crew. The Costa Concordia (2012) — delayed abandon ship order contributed to 32 deaths. The common thread: masters who delayed the decision cost lives. ISM Code Ch 5.2: "The Company shall ensure that the master is provided with the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely performed... The master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention." No company approval is needed or appropriate for an abandon ship decision. Water temperature and survival: 6°C water — cold shock within 1-2 minutes (potentially fatal if not wearing a lifejacket); swimming failure within 30 minutes; loss of consciousness (hypothermia) within approximately 30-60 minutes. Immersion suits significantly extend this time (to several hours in some conditions) but are still time-limited. The decision to delay must be weighed against a clock that is already running from the moment crew entered the water.

Question 3

The charterer is calling every hour demanding you depart despite a Force 9 forecast. The port manager says the berth is needed. Your Chief Officer's stability calculation shows GM 0.25m with a full container stack. What do you do?

Accepted Answer

COMMERCIAL PRESSURE vs SAFETY — Master's authority: (1) GM ASSESSMENT: 0.25m GM with containers and a Force 9 forecast must be assessed against the IS Code minimum (0.15m) AND the practical performance of the vessel in Force 9 (7-10m seas). While 0.25m exceeds the IS Code minimum, it provides very limited stability reserve in severe conditions with heavy rolling. A stability improvement should be sought — low ballasting, removal of topweight — before departure; (2) MASTER'S AUTHORITY: SOLAS V Rule 34.3 — the master's judgement on safety shall not be overridden by the owner, charterer, or any other person. ISM Code Ch 5.2 — overriding authority explicitly confirmed; (3) LEGAL POSITION: if the master departs under commercial pressure with an inadequate GM and the vessel capsizes, the master faces criminal negligence charges (MSA 1995 s.58 — operating in an unsafe manner). "I was told to go" is not a defence; (4) COMMUNICATION: document all communications — email/telex the charterer stating the reasons for delay and the decision. This creates an evidence trail; notify the company and DPA of the commercial pressure and safety concern; (5) STCW VIII/2: the master has the right to make decisions for the safety of the vessel and crew without interference; (6) DECISION: do not depart. Improve stability first. Reassess the departure weather window. Commercial pressure vs safety is the signature Master-level examination scenario because it tests command authority, legal knowledge, and professional courage. The MSC Napoli was in a marginal structural condition when it departed — subsequent MAIB investigation identified company pressure as a contributing factor. El Faro's last voyage — the master received multiple messages from the company about schedule pressure when he was attempting to navigate around Hurricane Joaquin. The legal position on following charterer instructions: the charterer can instruct the master on commercial matters (route, ports, cargo) but CANNOT override the master on safety matters. Any agreement to do so is void as contrary to SOLAS V/34. Practically: if a master departs against their own safety judgement under commercial pressure and an incident results, criminal prosecution under the Merchant Shipping Act is almost certain. The charterer's instruction provides no defence. Documentation of commercial pressure: creating a written record (telex, email, letter of protest) that pressure was applied and that departure was demanded is essential both as immediate evidence and for post-incident investigation. This also notifies the company — ISM requires the DPA to be available to support the master in exactly this type of situation.