Question 1

Two hours before entering a narrow fjord approach, your ECDIS and GPS both fail simultaneously. You have no internet. What do you do?

Accepted Answer

ECDIS AND GPS FAILURE — MASTER's RESPONSE: SOLAS V/19 BACKUP REQUIREMENT: SOLAS V/19.2.1.4 requires that vessels fitted with ECDIS must also carry paper charts (or a second independent ECDIS system) as backup for the route being navigated. ASSESS THE SITUATION — WHICH CHARTS ARE AVAILABLE?: (1) If paper charts are on board covering the fjord approach: (a) Extract and verify the charts are up to date (latest edition, NtM corrections applied); (b) Transfer the plot to paper — use DR position, last known GPS position, dead reckoning from the last fix; (c) Commence radar navigation with frequent position fixes using radar bearings and radar/chart comparison; (2) If ONLY ECDIS and NO paper charts for the area: (a) DO NOT PROCEED into the narrow approach; (b) Anchor or heave-to in safe water; (c) Request position fixing assistance — VTS, coastal stations, AIS from nearby vessels (but note GPS spoofing may affect AIS too); GPS DENIAL — ALTERNATIVE POSITIONING: (a) Radar fixing against known charted objects; (b) Visual bearings (transit, sextant if available); (c) Echo sounder — confirm water depth against chart; (d) Coastal radar assistance from VTS (some VTS can provide radar position); (e) LORAN (if receiver fitted and in coverage); (f) Dead reckoning from last confirmed position; DO NOT ENTER NARROW WATER: without reliable position fixing — a narrow fjord approach is too high risk. The master's decision to anchor/heave-to is mandatory. NOTIFY VTS: immediately inform VTS of the failure and intention. SOLAS V/19.2.1.4 — ECDIS backup: this SOLAS provision is critical knowledge. When a vessel is approved to use ECDIS in lieu of paper charts (Type Approval and flag state approval required) — it must have either: (a) a second independent ECDIS; or (b) adequate paper charts for the route. A vessel that has abandoned paper charts and relied solely on a single ECDIS has no backup if ECDIS fails. If paper charts are not available — the vessel cannot proceed into the narrow approach. This is a rare but real scenario with serious navigation risk implications. AIS as position reference (option B): AIS positions are derived from GPS. If GPS has failed — AIS positions are also potentially affected or unavailable. Additionally, AIS gives the position of OTHER vessels — not your vessel relative to the chart. Using AIS as a position reference for your own vessel is not a valid navigation fix method. "Proceed cautiously with buoys" (option C): a narrow fjord approach typically has minimal traffic management zones, many submerged rocks between channel markers, and severe penalties for grounding (cruise ships and large vessels have grounded in Norwegian fjords with catastrophic consequences). Reduced speed does not provide adequate margin without accurate position fixing. Pilot without electronic aids (option D): a pilot experienced in the fjord can navigate without GPS — using local knowledge, radar, and visual navigation. This IS a potential solution — but the pilot must be informed that ECDIS and GPS are not available so they can bring their own chart if needed. However, even the pilot cannot substitute for position fixing capability in conditions of reduced visibility. If clear visibility and daylight — a local pilot may be the best option. The answer A is more comprehensive in addressing the immediate priorities.

Question 2

Your vessel has a UMS (Unattended Machinery Space) notation. At 0200 a UMS alarm activates on the bridge. As Officer of the Watch, describe your response, and what does the master need to ensure is in place for UMS operations?

Accepted Answer

UMS ALARM RESPONSE AND MASTER's UMS OBLIGATIONS: SOLAS REGULATION II-1/46-54 (UMS REQUIREMENTS): UMS notation means the engine room can be operated without a watchkeeper present during normal operations. Requirements include: (a) Automatic alarm systems for all critical machinery; (b) Bridge control systems; (c) Adequate fire detection and fixed fire suppression; (d) Periodic rounds by the duty engineer at intervals (typically 30-60 minutes as per SMS); (e) ENGINEER ON CALL: the duty engineer must be immediately available and must respond to alarms within a defined time (typically 10 minutes to the engine room); UMS ALARM AT 0200 — OOW RESPONSE: (1) ASSESS THE ALARM: identify which alarm — high temperature, low pressure, overload, flooding alarm. Each has different urgency. Check alarm panel for source; (2) WAKE THE DUTY ENGINEER: immediately. The duty engineer responds to all UMS alarms. The OOW does not go to the engine room — their station is the bridge; (3) CALL THE MASTER: UMS alarms at 0200 = call the master as per standing orders. The master determines the response level; (4) MAINTAIN SAFE NAVIGATION: the OOW remains on the bridge. Do not compromise bridge watchkeeping for an engine room alarm — you cannot manage both; (5) MONITOR THE ALARM: note the time, the alarm type, the action taken; MASTER's UMS REQUIREMENTS: the master must ensure: (a) UMS standing orders are in place specifying which alarms require immediate master notification; (b) Engineer on-call duty roster is maintained; (c) SMS procedures for UMS operations are followed; (d) UMS audits are conducted and recorded; (e) The manual for UMS operations is available. SOLAS II-1 Part G (Periodically Unattended Machinery Spaces): SOLAS Regulation II-1/46-54 sets the technical standards for UMS operations. These include mandatory alarm systems, bridge control capability, and requirements for rapid engineer response. Most class societies (Lloyd's, DNV) issue a "UMS" notation on the classification certificate when the vessel meets these standards. Duty engineer response time: most class society UMS requirements and SMS procedures specify that the duty engineer must respond to an alarm within a defined time — typically 10-15 minutes. This is why the engineer is required to live on board (or be immediately contactable). A duty engineer who cannot be raised = UMS procedure failure = immediate master action required. OOW leaving the bridge (option C): the OOW's primary duty is safe navigation of the vessel. Abandoning the bridge to investigate an engine room alarm is a dereliction of watchkeeping duty. STCW A-VIII/2 requires an OOW to maintain continuous watch on the bridge. If the OOW leaves — someone else must take the watch (and that person must be qualified). "False alarm until confirmed" (option D): this attitude is dangerous and professionally unacceptable. Every alarm must be treated as genuine until established otherwise. A UMS alarm for high bilge water that is dismissed as "likely a false alarm" while the engine room floods would be catastrophic. The alarm system exists because the engine room is unmanned — a delayed response could allow a manageable situation to become an emergency. Alarm acknowledgment logging: every UMS alarm acknowledged on the bridge must be logged with time, alarm type, and action taken. This is an ISM SMS requirement and a PSC inspection target.

Question 3

Your vessel uses high-voltage (6.6kV) electrical systems for bow thrusters. A crew member without electrical certification asks to work near the high-voltage switchboard. What are your obligations?

Accepted Answer

HIGH VOLTAGE ELECTRICAL SAFETY — MASTER's OBLIGATIONS: HIGH VOLTAGE ON MODERN VESSELS: modern large vessels (container ships, LNG carriers, cruise ships) frequently use high-voltage distribution systems (3.3kV, 6.6kV, or 11kV) for large motors (thrusters, pumps, compressors). SOLAS II-1 and IEC 60092 standards govern the installation. CRITICAL SAFETY PRINCIPLE — HIGH VOLTAGE: high voltage (defined as >1000V AC or >1500V DC) can cause: (a) Electrocution — very fast (40mA through the heart is lethal at 6.6kV); (b) Arc flash — potentially hundreds of kilojoules of energy in milliseconds, causing severe burns, blindness, hearing damage; (c) Blast injuries; COMPETENCE REQUIREMENT: work on or near high-voltage electrical systems requires: (a) STCW Regulation III/1 (Electro-Technical Officer — ETO) or equivalent electrical certification; (b) Company-specific HV permit to work (PTW) system; (c) Approved Electrician qualification (typically national electrical certification); (d) HV safety training (IET/UK standards or equivalent); MASTER's OBLIGATION: (1) DO NOT PERMIT uncertified crew to work near HV switchboards — this is an absolute prohibition; (2) ISOLATION FIRST: high-voltage circuits must be isolated, locked off, and tested dead (LOTO — Lock Out Tag Out) before any work can be done near them; (3) PTW MANDATORY: a comprehensive Permit to Work is required for any HV electrical work; (4) ONLY QUALIFIED PERSONS: ETO, Chief Engineer with HV certification, or a shore specialist approved by the company; (5) SAFE DISTANCE: even near an energised HV switchboard — non-qualified persons must be kept at a safe distance (minimum approach distance per IEC standards varies — typically 300mm for 6.6kV). Arc flash energy at 6.6kV: an arc flash event at 6.6kV in a medium-voltage switchboard can release energy measured in tens to hundreds of kilojoules — sufficient to cause third-degree burns across the body at distances of several metres, and to destroy switchgear. Protective equipment against arc flash (arc flash suit, face shield rated to the incident energy level) is a specialised requirement beyond ordinary PPE. Rubber gloves (option B): rubber insulating gloves rated to the working voltage are required PPE for HV work — but they are ONE component of the required PPE and competence. Rubber-soled shoes provide minimal protection against high-voltage electrocution. The idea that basic PPE substitutes for HV competence and certification is extremely dangerous. Master responsibility for crew safety: the master bears responsibility for crew safety under ISM Code, SOLAS, and MLC. The chief engineer manages technical systems — but the MASTER has overarching duty of care for all crew. A master who permits uncertified crew to work near HV systems and a fatality results faces potential gross negligence liability. LOTO — Lock Out Tag Out: LOTO is the internationally recognised procedure for making electrical systems safe before work. At 6.6kV: (a) Identify and isolate the circuit; (b) Lock the isolation switch in the OFF position (padlock); (c) Tag the lock with the worker's identity; (d) Test that the circuit is dead (with an approved HV voltage detector); (e) Earth the circuit before working on it. Only after all steps are complete can work begin. "Awareness training" (option D): general electrical awareness training is not sufficient for HV systems. HV competence is a specific higher-level qualification. Even under ETO supervision — an unqualified person assisting with HV work is at risk if an unexpected event occurs (arc flash, accidental energisation).