A vessel is operating closed bus instead of the FMEA-assumed open bus configuration for a DP3 critical activity. What is the operational consequence for the Worst Case Failure assumption?

A. Operating closed bus when the FMEA's WCF analysis assumed open bus may mean a single fault (e.g. a switchboard fault) could now propagate across both sections, exceeding the WCF the class notation and ASOG were built on — this must be reconciled with the FMEA, not just decided operationally

B. The FMEA automatically updates itself to reflect whichever bus configuration is in use at the time

C. Closed bus always provides more redundancy than open bus, so this is a safety improvement requiring no further consideration

D. Bus configuration has no bearing on WCF; WCF only concerns thrusters

A. It is a manual logbook system maintained by the engineering officer

B. It exists solely to control hotel load (accommodation power), separate from DP thrust power

C. It automatically manages generator start/stop, load sharing, bus configuration, and load shedding to ensure sufficient power is always available for DP thrust demand, while protecting against blackout from overload

D. It only logs fuel consumption for reporting purposes

A. It refers to manually unloading cargo to reduce vessel draft

B. It is a planned maintenance activity to rotate generator running hours

C. It means switching all power to the emergency generator during normal operations

D. It is an automatic PMS function that disconnects pre-defined non-essential loads (or de-rates thruster demand) when generation capacity is at risk of being exceeded, preventing a generator overload trip that could cascade into a full blackout