A vessel is operating closed bus instead of the FMEA-assumed open bus configuration for a DP3 critical activity. What is the operational consequence for the Worst Case Failure assumption?

A. Closed bus always provides more redundancy than open bus, so this is a safety improvement requiring no further consideration

B. The FMEA automatically updates itself to reflect whichever bus configuration is in use at the time

C. Operating closed bus when the FMEA's WCF analysis assumed open bus may mean a single fault (e.g. a switchboard fault) could now propagate across both sections, exceeding the WCF the class notation and ASOG were built on — this must be reconciled with the FMEA, not just decided operationally

D. Bus configuration has no bearing on WCF; WCF only concerns thrusters

A. It is a manual logbook system maintained by the engineering officer

B. It exists solely to control hotel load (accommodation power), separate from DP thrust power

C. It only logs fuel consumption for reporting purposes

D. It automatically manages generator start/stop, load sharing, bus configuration, and load shedding to ensure sufficient power is always available for DP thrust demand, while protecting against blackout from overload

A. It refers to manually unloading cargo to reduce vessel draft

B. It is an automatic PMS function that disconnects pre-defined non-essential loads (or de-rates thruster demand) when generation capacity is at risk of being exceeded, preventing a generator overload trip that could cascade into a full blackout

C. It means switching all power to the emergency generator during normal operations

D. It is a planned maintenance activity to rotate generator running hours