Question 1

As Chief Mate on watch in the Malacca Strait at night with 8 radar contacts within 5nm and two requiring action, how do you manage the bridge resources?

Accepted Answer

MULTI-CONTACT BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT — MALACCA STRAIT: SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT: The Malacca Strait is one of the world's busiest waterways — approximately 80,000 vessels per year. Traffic includes: supertankers, container ships, fishing vessels, small ferries. The TSS (Malacca Strait VTS system) applies. 8 contacts within 5nm with 2 requiring action = HIGH TRAFFIC ENVIRONMENT requiring full bridge team. BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (BRM): (1) CALL THE MASTER: immediately. This level of traffic is not appropriate for solo watch. Night, restricted area, multiple action contacts = master required on bridge. "Call me if in doubt" — this IS doubt; (2) CALL ADDITIONAL WATCH OFFICER: if available — request additional officer on bridge. Extra eyes on radar and visual; (3) MANUAL STEERING: switch from autopilot to manual steering. Helmsman on the wheel. In dense traffic, manual steering allows faster and more precise response; (4) PRIORITY MANAGEMENT: identify which of the 2 contacts are most urgent. Deal with the closest/fastest closing FIRST. Do not try to simultaneously manage both — prioritise; (5) COMMUNICATION PLAN: agree on which officer watches which radar range and monitors which contacts; (6) VHF: if necessary — contact the vessel creating the greatest risk by name on VHF 16/VTS channel. In the Malacca Strait, VHF 16/12 (VTIS — Vessel Traffic Information System); (7) REDUCE SPEED: reducing speed simplifies the tactical picture and gives more time for each decision; (8) BRM PRINCIPLE: no single person can safely manage 8 contacts requiring action in the Malacca Strait at night alone. Call for help before, not after, the situation deteriorates. BRM — the core principle: Bridge Resource Management teaches that a single officer cannot simultaneously manage a complex tactical situation AND maintain lookout AND monitor equipment AND make navigation decisions AND communicate. Adding a second officer (or calling the master) divides the cognitive load. In the Malacca Strait, with 8 contacts at night — two people are the minimum; three is better. STCW A-VIII/2 and BRM: STCW requires that officers keep an effective watch and maintain the safety of the vessel. An OOW who recognises they are overloaded and calls for help is acting professionally. An OOW who tries to handle an overwhelming situation alone — and causes an accident — has failed both professionally and under STCW. VHF coordination (option C): VHF coordination is a supplement to COLREGs — not a replacement. The Malacca Strait Cooperative Mechanism includes VHF channels and VTS information services. However, VHF contact with 8 vessels simultaneously is impossible. Additionally, COLREGs actions must be taken — you cannot tell other vessels to hold their course if you are the give-way vessel. VHF contact is useful for identifying specific vessels and confirming passing arrangements — it does not replace COLREG manoeuvring. Anchoring in the Malacca Strait (option D): anchoring in the Malacca Strait main shipping lanes is extremely dangerous — the vessel would become a hazard to other traffic. The Strait is relatively shallow (around 25m in the shipping lanes) and anchoring might be physically possible, but the risk of collision with passing shipping would be enormous. This option would create the very emergency it attempts to avoid.

Question 2

As Chief Mate on watch in open sea, you detect a vessel 10nm ahead with zero CPA and TCPA 30 minutes. Describe the characteristics of a proper avoiding action under Rule 8.

Accepted Answer

RULE 8 — CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPER AVOIDING ACTION: RULE 8 APPLIES TO ALL VESSELS in a potential collision situation, regardless of which rules govern the encounter (crossing, overtaking, head-on). The characteristics: (1) EARLY: action taken in ample time — not waiting until close quarters. With 30 minutes to CPA and 10nm, early action is available. Rule 8(a): action shall be taken "in ample time"; (2) BOLD AND SUBSTANTIAL: Rule 8(b): action shall be "large enough to be readily apparent to the other vessel observing visually or by radar." Small incremental alterations (5° at a time) do not meet this standard. The other vessel must be able to see a CLEAR alteration on their radar; (3) POSITIVE: not just an alteration but a committed and maintained course to the clear; (4) RESULT IN PASSING AT A SAFE DISTANCE: Rule 8(d): the action must result in passing at a safe distance. A 0.5nm CPA in busy waters may be adequate; in open ocean — some companies require 2nm minimum CPA; (5) MAINTAIN THE ALTERATION: do not return to the original course until clearly past and clear; (6) AVOID DANGEROUS COMBINATIONS: Rule 8(c): if necessary to avoid collision or to allow more time — reduce speed or take all way off. Speed reduction alone or combined with course alteration is a valid manoeuvre; SPECIFIC CASE (0 CPA, 30 min): Give way vessel should alter significantly to starboard (if crossing, overtaking, or head-on) — aim for CPA of at least 1-2nm and confirm on radar before resuming original course; (7) RULE 8(e): "necessary to pass at a safe distance". The "5° is not enough" principle: Rule 8(b) specifically requires that course alterations be "large enough to be readily apparent to the other vessel observing visually or by radar." On radar, a 5° alteration is extremely difficult to distinguish from normal navigation variability over 30 minutes. A 30° starboard alteration is clearly visible as a bearing change on the other vessel's radar display. The rule of thumb: 30° alteration produces about 0.5nm change in CPA per mile of range. Radar detection of alteration: an observer on the other vessel watching the radar will see a clear change in the bearing trend if a substantial alteration is made. If the alteration is too small to detect, the other vessel will not know you are taking action — close-quarters will still develop. This is the purpose of the "bold and substantial" requirement. MAIB investigation of Rule 8: several MAIB collision reports have identified that the give-way vessel made "insufficient" alterations — the alteration was made but was too small to be effective or apparent. The avoiding vessel felt they had taken action; the other vessel was unaware of any action and continued on course. Five short blasts (option D): the five short blasts is the DANGER/DOUBT signal (Rule 34(d)) — it expresses doubt about the other vessel's intentions or signals that a vessel does not understand what another is doing. It is NOT a substitute for collision avoidance manoeuvring. Sounding five short blasts while maintaining course is useless for collision avoidance if no other action is taken.

Question 3

In a crossing situation, you are the stand-on vessel. The give-way vessel has not altered course despite your close approach. At what point and how do you act?

Accepted Answer

STAND-ON VESSEL OBLIGATIONS — RULES 16 AND 17: RULE 17 — INITIAL DUTY: the stand-on vessel shall "maintain her course and speed" to allow the give-way vessel to take action. This stability of action allows the give-way vessel to predict the stand-on vessel's position. RULE 17(a)(ii) — MAY ACT: when it becomes APPARENT that the give-way vessel is not taking appropriate action — the stand-on vessel "may take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone." This is a PERMISSION — not yet an obligation. This trigger point is a matter of professional judgement — typically when the stand-on vessel can see that the give-way vessel has not altered AND CPA is becoming dangerously small. RULE 17(b) — MUST ACT: when the stand-on vessel determines that collision "cannot be avoided by the action of the giving way vessel alone" — the stand-on vessel "shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision." This is the MANDATORY action trigger. At this point — the stand-on vessel MUST act. The action must be: (a) not an alteration to port for a vessel on the port side (Rule 17(c)); (b) bold and substantial; (c) early enough to be effective. SEQUENCE IN THIS SCENARIO: (1) Monitor CPA trend; (2) Sound danger signal (Rule 34(d)) when doubt exists; (3) If no response — consider taking avoiding action under Rule 17(a)(ii); (4) When collision cannot be avoided by give-way alone — MUST act under Rule 17(b); (5) Do NOT turn to port toward a vessel on your port side (Rule 17(c)). Rule 17(c) — no alteration to port: this is one of the most important specific constraints in the COLREGs. In a crossing situation where the give-way vessel is on the STARBOARD side of the stand-on vessel (approaching from starboard) — the stand-on vessel must NOT alter to PORT. Altering to port would swing the stand-on vessel's bow toward the approaching give-way vessel — potentially making the collision more severe. The stand-on vessel's primary avoiding action in a crossing situation where the give-way is to starboard: STARBOARD alteration or SPEED REDUCTION (both swing the bow away from the approaching vessel or create more time/distance). Rule 17(b) as a legal obligation: once the stand-on vessel determines that the give-way vessel cannot alone prevent collision — Rule 17(b) makes action MANDATORY. A stand-on vessel that maintains course and speed into a certain collision because "it was my right of way" is in violation of Rule 17(b). Courts have held both vessels equally negligent in collisions where the stand-on vessel failed to take action under Rule 17(b). "Never alter until collision" (option B): Rule 17 explicitly states the stand-on vessel "may" and eventually "shall" take action. The rule was designed with exactly this scenario in mind — a give-way vessel that fails to act. Blind adherence to course/speed into a certain collision is not professional seamanship and is a COLREG violation under Rule 17(b). Sound signal and alter (option C): sounding one short blast signals an intention to alter to STARBOARD (Rule 34(a)). This is appropriate IF the stand-on vessel is altering to starboard. However, sounding one short blast without actually altering, or altering to port while sounding one blast, is a misuse of the sound signal. The signal should reflect the actual manoeuvre.