Question 1

Both ÎLE DE GROIX and ACADIE had each other on radar in thick fog, in a narrow 200m-wide channel. What was missing that BEAmer identified as the key failure?

Accepted Answer

Direct bridge-to-bridge VHF communication between the two captains to confirm each other's intentions Both captains had radar contact on each other well before the collision, but neither called the other directly by VHF to confirm course and intentions — relying instead on a single relayed exchange via a deckhand's handheld radio. BEAmer's own finding is explicit: direct VHF communication between the captains would likely have prevented the collision.

Question 2

Rule 5 (Look-out) requires every vessel at all times to maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing, as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions — and this duty applies even when the vessel is at anchor in a busy anchorage.

Accepted Answer

True True. Rule 5 applies 'at all times' and to 'every vessel'. A vessel at anchor in a busy anchorage still needs an effective look-out to detect drifting vessels, dragging anchors, or approaching traffic that may pose a risk of collision or contact.

Question 3

Under Rule 6 (Safe Speed), a vessel fitted with a fully operational radar and ARPA never needs to reduce speed in restricted visibility, because the equipment guarantees early detection of other vessels.

Accepted Answer

False False. Rule 6 explicitly lists radar capability as one factor to consider, but also requires accounting for the state of visibility, traffic density, manoeuvrability, and the limitations of radar (range scale, sea/rain clutter, blind sectors). Even a vessel with excellent radar must proceed at a speed that allows proper and effective action to avoid collision and to be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances.