Question 1

An AB almost falls overboard while removing mooring lines in port. No injury occurred. As Chief Mate, what is your obligation?

Accepted Answer

NEAR-MISS REPORTING — CM OBLIGATIONS: ISM Code Section 9.1: "The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety." A near-fall overboard is a HAZARDOUS OCCURRENCE (near-miss) and MUST be reported. CM PROCEDURE: (1) IMMEDIATE: ensure the AB is safe. Provide first aid if any injury — even minor; (2) WITNESS ACCOUNTS: gather accounts from witnesses while events are fresh — who was there, what they saw, what the AB was doing; (3) REPORT: complete the company Near-Miss/Hazardous Occurrence report form. Submit to master within 24 hours; (4) MASTER REVIEW: master reviews and co-signs the report and sends to DPA; (5) DPA/COMPANY: the DPA investigates and responds with corrective actions; (6) INVESTIGATION: the CM leads a brief internal investigation — WHY did this occur? (a) Was the AB wearing a lifejacket? (Should be — working near/over the side); (b) Were mooring procedures in the SMS followed? (c) Was a risk assessment completed?; (7) CORRECTIVE ACTION: identify what needs to change — new procedure, additional PPE, better briefing, additional supervision; (8) LEARNING: feed the lesson into a fleet-wide toolbox talk (with company anonymisation if required); ISM REPORTING CULTURE: near-miss reporting works when crew trust that reporting will not lead to punishment. CM must enforce a no-blame reporting culture. If ABs fear reporting near-misses — the company learns nothing and the next incident may be fatal. Near-miss vs accident definition: MAIB Regulations 2012 define a "marine accident" as a death, injury, or damage. A near-miss (near-fall with no injury) is NOT a MAIB-reportable accident. However, ISM Code Section 9.1 requires the company's SMS to include reporting of "hazardous situations" — near-misses. The ISM distinction: MAIB reports accidents. ISM reports hazardous situations, near-misses, and non-conformities. These go to the DPA, not MAIB. Option (D) confuses the two. The no-blame culture: safety research (Heinrich's triangle, Swiss Cheese model) demonstrates that for every fatal accident, there are hundreds of near-misses. A company that encourages near-miss reporting identifies and eliminates systemic hazards before they kill someone. The CM who suppresses near-miss reports — even with good intentions ("don't want the AB in trouble") — removes a safety-critical warning signal. ISM Code Section 9.1 requires the SMS to create a system for reporting. If the company does not have a near-miss form — that is itself an ISM non-conformity. AB not wearing a lifejacket: if the investigation reveals the AB was not wearing a lifejacket while working near the ship's side (as required by COSWP and the ship's SMS) — that is a safety violation that must be addressed. The corrective action might include a refresher toolbox talk and a check that PPE is being worn.

Question 2

You are Chief Mate approaching a busy port in restricted visibility with a pilot embarked. How do you allocate bridge team roles?

Accepted Answer

BRIDGE TEAM ROLE ALLOCATION — PILOTAGE RESTRICTED VISIBILITY: The STCW 2010 Code A-VIII/2 and IMO Model Course 1.22 (Bridge Resource Management) define the principles. Bridge team composition and roles: (1) MASTER: in overall command — has decision authority. May take conn in high-risk manoeuvring (not required if pilot is competent). Monitors overall situation; (2) PILOT: advises on port-specific navigation, tides, berth approach. Master retains command — the pilot does NOT displace the master's authority. If pilot actions seem unsafe, master must intervene; (3) CHIEF MATE (CO, Conning Officer if master not conning): monitor all sources — radar, ECDIS, visual, pilot card information; act as cross-check on pilot's actions; track position against passage plan; (4) OOW AT RADAR: dedicated ARPA operator — monitoring all traffic; reporting contacts to conning officer; CPA/TCPA of all contacts in approach channel; (5) LOOKOUT/HELMSMAN: dedicated helmsman on manual steering (switch to manual on master's order before pilotage). Dedicated lookout at bow or on bridge wing; (6) RATINGS: anchor party on standby (anchor ready for letting go); (7) ENGINEER: brief chief engineer — on immediate notice (engine control to bridge). Engine order telegraph confirmation procedure. TASK ALLOCATION PRINCIPLE: each person has one primary task. No multi-tasking on critical navigation. The CM's specific role is cross-checking — if the pilot's ordered course/speed does not match the passage plan and no reason is given — the CM challenges. Pilot authority vs master authority: SOLAS V/34 and flag state law (Pilotage Act 1987 in UK): the pilot is an adviser. The master retains COMMAND of the vessel at all times. A pilot can be an expert navigator in that port, but the master is legally responsible for the vessel's safe navigation. If a pilot gives an order that the master considers unsafe — the master must countermand it. This is not a matter of rudeness — it is a legal and professional obligation. Authority gradient: in BRM terms, an authority gradient that is too steep (only one person giving orders, no one challenging) leads to situations where errors go unchallenged. The CM's cross-checking role is exactly the BRM counter to over-reliance on the pilot. Manual steering in pilotage (option D): it is standard practice to switch from autopilot to hand steering before approaching a port. The helmsman must be briefed on: the wheel response of the vessel at low speed; the conning officer's commands; confirmation procedure (echo-back all orders). A lookout on the bridge wing in restricted visibility provides additional situational awareness the radar cannot always replicate. Anchor at readiness: in difficult approaches, the anchor at cockbill (ready to let go) provides an emergency braking option. The CM (or officer on the forecastle) communicates directly with the master on the bridge.

Question 3

The pilot orders "Hard to port" on approach to the berth, but your ECDIS shows this course will take you over a shoal. The master is not yet on the bridge. What do you do?

Accepted Answer

CHALLENGING PILOT — CM AUTHORITY: IMMEDIATE ACTION: (1) SPEAK UP IMMEDIATELY: "Pilot, ECDIS shows a shoal on the port approach — I recommend holding course until master is consulted. Do you confirm safe water to port?"; (2) DO NOT ASSUME PILOT IS WRONG: pilots know the port — but ECDIS data may be correct. Wait for a response. If the pilot confirms safe water with a specific reason (dredged channel, more recent survey data), log the exchange and proceed cautiously; (3) IF PILOT INSISTS AND CM NOT SATISFIED: "Stop engines. Helmsman, hold present course." Then immediately call the master: "Captain to the bridge urgently — pilot has ordered hard-to-port over charted shoal. Require your decision immediately."; (4) NEVER OVERRIDE PILOT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY ALONE (unless imminent collision): the CM does not countermand a pilot order without master authority except to prevent imminent disaster; (5) DOCUMENT: note the time, the exchange, and the outcome in the log. If a near-miss or close call occurs — this documentation protects the vessel operator; (6) BRM PRINCIPLE — POSITIVE CHALLENGE: a challenge is not aggressive — it is professional. The phrase "I am concerned that..." or "My chart shows..." initiates the cross-check loop without creating confrontation. The pilot should respond to a legitimate navigational concern; (7) POST-INCIDENT: if the pilot was demonstrably wrong — raise with port authority/pilot body via the master. The challenge loop (BRM): identify the concern → communicate the concern → confirm or escalate → document. This is the BRM cycle that has been proven to prevent accidents. ECDIS versus pilot local knowledge: ECDIS shows official chart data. Pilots may have current knowledge of undredged shoals or recent surveys not yet in ECDIS — but they may also make errors. The correct response is not to override and not to comply blindly — it is to challenge positively and escalate to the master immediately. The CM's authority without the master: the CM has authority to take emergency action to prevent immediate collision. "Hard-to-port over a shoal" may cause grounding — which qualifies as imminent danger. The CM has a STCW duty to take protective action. But the first step is always the positive challenge — the pilot may have good reason. "Do not challenge the pilot" (option C): the CM has a professional and legal obligation to challenge unsafe orders. STCW II/2 competence includes: "ensures that a safe navigational watch is maintained at all times." If the master is not on the bridge, the CM IS the senior officer present. Waiting passively while the vessel approaches a shoal is a dereliction of duty. The ISM dimension: failure to challenge and a subsequent grounding would be found in any ISM internal audit to be a bridge resource management failure — with direct professional consequences for the CM.