Question 1

The Master arrives on the bridge at 0221. Steering has been partially restored on the emergency hydraulic circuit — the vessel responds slowly but can maintain a course within ±10°. Depth is 85m, rising to 60m toward the headland. The vessel is 5.5nm from the headland, making 4 knots on momentum. The chief engineer reports the engine will not restart for at least 30 minutes.

Should the Master anchor?

Accepted Answer

Yes — at 4 knots with 30 minutes to engine restart and 5.5nm to the headland, the safety margin is too small to rely on momentum alone. Walk back speed and anchor now while depth allows. Anchoring in 85m is demanding but achievable and preferable to grounding Option D is the most dangerous misconception here. COLREGS Rule 10(g) specifically states a vessel shall not anchor in a TSS if it can be avoided — but this vessel cannot avoid it. Rule 10(g) permits anchoring when necessary for safety. At 4 knots with partial steering and 30 minutes to engine restart, the vector calculation gives very little margin. Waiting for 60m water depth is a gamble that risks being too close to the headland to deploy successfully. The anchor should go now while depth and sea room still allow cable to be walked back.

Question 2

MV CEDAR RIDGE, 0215. You are the OOW. The engine telegraph is set at full ahead. You notice the RPM repeater on the bridge has dropped from 98 to 74 RPM over the last 4 minutes without any engine room call. Visibility 2nm. Headland 9nm to the west. Set/drift pushing the vessel 1.5 knots toward the headland.

What is your immediate priority?

Accepted Answer

Call the Master immediately and simultaneously ring the engine room to report the loss of RPM. Do not wait to investigate further — you are approaching a headland in reduced visibility with a set toward it and your speed is unexpectedly reducing SOLAS V and standard BRM require the Master to be called for any change that may affect the safe navigation of the vessel — and a loss of power approaching a headland in restricted visibility with an adverse set is exactly that situation. The instinct to "investigate before disturbing the Master" is a dangerous normalisation: the Master cannot make informed decisions if he is called 10 minutes late. Call Master AND engine room simultaneously. The course alteration alone solves nothing if the engine is failing.

Question 3

Before the Master or engine room responds, at 0217 a total blackout occurs. All navigation lights, radar, ECDIS, and steering control lose power simultaneously. The emergency lighting activates. The vessel is now at 8nm from the headland, making approximately 8 knots on momentum. No response from the engine room.

What is the FIRST thing you do?

Accepted Answer

Sound the general alarm immediately to muster all crew. Make a SECURITÉ broadcast on VHF Ch.16 to warn other traffic that you are a vessel not under command. Attempt to raise the engine room by telephone. Sound the NUC sound signals (2 prolonged blasts) In a blackout the immediate priority is collision avoidance — you are a vessel not under command and traffic cannot see you. General alarm alerts crew; NUC signals (COLREGS Rule 35e: 2 prolonged blasts in restricted visibility) warn other vessels; SECURITÉ on Ch.16 provides situational awareness to the traffic picture. Manual steering is irrelevant without propulsion. Leaving the bridge to investigate the generator is a solo action that abandons the conn at the most critical moment. The emergency generator will start automatically — your job is collision avoidance and crew muster.