BSafe Case Study 27 — Behind Schedule, Departing Without a Briefing, Into 51 Knots

Already Behind, Before the Gust Ever Hit

A storm was already causing gale-force winds of 30-40 knots in the Dover Strait. The ferry's first Calais berthing attempt was aborted; the master requested tug assistance and berthed successfully at 1033 — nearly an hour behind the 1035 original departure slot before even loading. With the ship now running late, and despite the still-difficult conditions, the master decided tug assistance would not be needed for departure, and — against company procedure — no formal pre-departure briefing was held with the bridge team.

A Swing That Wouldn't Stop, and a Handover That Went Wrong Mid-Manoeuvre

Moorings let go at 1138. By 1141, swinging the bow to starboard to depart, wind was recorded at 51 knots from the starboard side. At 1142, the No. 1 bow thruster tripped again and the main engine alarmed on high load — the same propulsion reliability problems that had been increasingly common since the ship switched fuel type six months earlier. By 1144, heading almost directly into the wind but still swinging rapidly to starboard, the master tried to check the swing and asked the helmsman to take control from the central console.

The helmsman didn't follow the correct procedure for taking control — his early steering inputs did nothing, the rudders staying at midships while he believed he was steering. The master caught this and had control properly transferred, then ordered full ahead on both engines and a course south. The helmsman put both rudders hard to port — with this ship's high-lift rudders, that produced minimal headway but moved the stern bodily to starboard, checking the swing without achieving the needed turn to port. The ship drifted toward a nearby jetty, struck it at 1146 (stopping the starboard propeller on overload), and grounded in shallow water roughly 20 seconds later.

What MAIB's Investigation Found

• The master likely felt real time or commercial pressure to depart promptly given the ship was already behind schedule — a pressure that shaped both the skipped briefing and the decision to forgo tugs.
• The master's attempt to steady the ship's heading was insufficient for the conditions, made worse by the helmsman's inexperience with this ship's specific high-lift rudder behaviour.
• The manoeuvre might have succeeded with both bow thrusters available and main engines performing optimally — reliability problems since the ULSFO fuel switch had been a known, ongoing issue for six months.
• The control handover from the bridge wing station to the central console did not go cleanly — the helmsman's initial inputs had no effect because the correct transfer procedure wasn't followed the first time.

Recommended Actions

Direct from MAIB's findings:

1. A pre-departure briefing is a standing company procedure for a reason — schedule pressure is exactly the condition under which skipping it is most tempting and most risky, not a reasonable exception.
2. A decision to forgo tug assistance in marginal weather needs to weigh the vessel's own known equipment reliability issues (here, a documented pattern of thruster and engine problems), not just the conditions in isolation.
3. Control transfer between stations needs a confirmed, practiced handover procedure — a helmsman's steering inputs having no effect during an active manoeuvre is a moment that can't afford confusion.
4. Ship-specific handling characteristics (like high-lift rudders producing lateral stern movement rather than a turn) need to be genuinely familiar to whoever may be asked to take the helm during a difficult manoeuvre, not assumed as general seamanship knowledge.

Human Element Analysis

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Related Reading

• BSafe Case Study 18 – another real grounding where an incomplete process met genuine time pressure