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BSafe Case Study 9 — A Sling That Would Have Failed a Visual Check

🕑 5 min read words Safety • Incident

Vessel: General cargo ship, 11,000 GT, alongside
Date & location: Main deck, retrieving hatch cover lifting gear for wind turbine cargo loading
Outcome: Serious head injury to one AB, minor hand injury to a second
Human factors: Standing in a Known Fall Zone · A Recurring Problem Never Reported · Worn Equipment Never Discarded
Source: Britannia P&I Club, BSafe Incident Case Study No. 9, drawn from MAIB Investigation Report 11/2020

1 real case studyMAIB Report 11/2020~4 min read

Gear Stored Where It Would Snag

The ship had no designated storage space for its hatch cover lifting gear — two sets of heavy wire rope slinging legs, each weighing 0.6 tonnes, had been stowed on pallets in a ventilation duct space since the ship was delivered. That space was known to snag the gear on retrieval. It had happened before, more than once; each time, the crew had freed it by hand after the crane stopped, and moved on. No near-miss report was ever filed.

The Snag That Didn't Get Freed in Time

Weather had delayed the day's cargo prep; work resumed that evening once conditions improved. Two ABs entered the duct space, rigged the first set of lifting gear to the crane hook with a fibre sling, climbed out, and stood close to the hatch edge — inside the load's fall zone — ready to guide it clear of snags as it lifted, exactly as they always had. The load snagged around 2-3 metres up; the crew freed it by hand as usual and the lift resumed. A shackle then caught on a ventilation trunk coaming. The chief officer ordered an immediate stop — but at that same moment, the fibre sling parted and the gear fell, striking both ABs.

Post-incident testing of the parted sling and five similar ones from the ship found all six would have failed a basic visual inspection — soiled, with illegible identification markings.

What MAIB's Investigation Found

  • The SMS contained no risk assessment or procedure for stowing or handling this lifting gear, and no guidance on conducting a lifting plan or identifying fall zones.
  • With no procedure to follow, the crew had developed their own informal method — including standing in the fall zone to manually clear snags, something that had ‘worked’ every previous time.
  • The recurring snagging problem was never escalated as a near miss, so it never triggered a review of the storage arrangement or the method being used.
  • The ship's design had no dedicated lifting-gear storage; the improvised arrangement the crew built had real snag hazards nobody had formally assessed.
  • The sling that failed carried a safe working load more than twice the weight of the load — but its poor physical condition meant it should have been discarded before ever being used.

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