All Sectors

Eight Seconds: What the Death of Jack Walker on Wilaya Tells Every Fisherman About Potting Safety

🕑 5 min read words Safety • Incident

Jack Sound, 1 May 2025 — 13:30

Wilaya was a 9.34m catamaran potting vessel working lobster grounds off the Pembrokeshire coast. On board were the skipper, deckhand Jack Walker, 35, and a retired workboat master along for the day as a passenger. The sea was calm. It was a clear, sunny morning. The crew had been hauling and shooting strings all day.

At about 13:10, the skipper hauled the thirteenth string — 10 pots — and the deckhand stacked them ready to shoot again. The vessel headed eastwards. The skipper signalled the deckhand to begin the deployment.

The deckhand deployed the dhan buoy and leading end weight, then stepped between the stacked pots and the stern ramp and downstacked each pot in turn as the vessel moved forward at 7–8 knots. Once the last pot had deployed, he moved forward to reposition the tail end weight from behind the wheelhouse to midships.

A bight formed in the running back rope as he moved the weight. The rope snared his leg.

From the moment the last pot deployed to the rope catching him: less than 8 seconds.

The skipper and passenger saw it happen and put the vessel in neutral immediately. They went to the stern, made the dhan line fast, passed the remaining line to the pot hauler, and began to recover it. Jack Walker surfaced briefly — buoyed by his inflated 150N personal flotation device — and then was pulled under. When he broke the surface alongside the vessel, his leg was still snared in the back rope. The skipper and passenger lifted him aboard and cut the back rope. He was unresponsive.

CPR began at 13:38. It continued when he was transferred to the RNLI all-weather lifeboat at 14:14. A paramedic arrived by helicopter at 14:36. It did not work. Jack Walker was pronounced deceased at 15:40.

MAIB Report 12/2026 found four failures — and noted this was the sixth UK potting vessel fatality in 20 months.

What the Investigation Found

1. It Was Not Really a Self-Shooting System

Wilaya’s pot deployment required the deckhand to downstack each of the 10 pots individually as they deployed, and then manually reposition the tail end weight once the last pot had gone. At 7–8 knots with 31 metres of back rope paying out, the deckhand had no physical separation from the running gear at the moment of greatest risk.

The Fishermen’s Safety Guide and Seafish FS45 Potting Safety Advisory Note both specify that self-shooting means crew separation from the gear at every stage. The MAIB drew the conclusion directly: ‘The safety benefits of a self-shooting system are negated when physical interaction is required during the process.’

Wilaya’s deck had no pound boards — no physical barrier between the crew and the running gear at any point. That absence was the gap that killed.

2. The Risk Assessment Was Not Being Followed

Wilaya’s risk assessment identified the hazard and specified the control: Stand in wheelhouse when gear is being shot. On 1 May 2025, the deckhand was on the open deck throughout the deployment. The control that directly addressed the fatal hazard was not being applied.

The MAIB found the skipper had developed confidence in the working method because no MOB had previously occurred. The consequence: ‘unsafe practices had become routine.’ The absence of a previous accident is not evidence of safety.

3. Safety Equipment Listed in the Risk Assessment Was Not on Board

Wilaya’s MOB hazard records specified body harnesses and safety lanyards as required controls. Neither were on board. The MAIB found ‘a disconnect between hazard recognition and operational practice’ — the paperwork identified the equipment needed; the equipment did not exist on the vessel.

4. Mandatory Skipper Training Had Not Been Completed

With 15 years at sea, Wilaya’s skipper more than met the definition of an experienced fisherman. The Seafish 1-day Safety Awareness and Risk Assessment course is mandatory for fishermen with 2 or more years’ experience under the Fishing Vessels (Safety Training) (Amendment) Regulations 2004. The skipper had not completed it. When the MCA inspected Wilaya in March 2024, the inspector recorded qualifications as ‘satisfactory’ — incorrectly. The MCA has since instructed surveyors to verify this training specifically.

The Pattern That Keeps Repeating

Between 2013 and 2023, the MAIB recorded 47 MOB incidents on UK potting vessels. 55% resulted in fatalities. In 11 of those 26 fatal accidents, the identified causal factor was the absence of physical separation between the crew and running gear during shooting. Of those 11, nine were not wearing a PFD.

Wilaya was the sixth UK potting vessel fatality in 20 months. The causal factor was the same as it has been in investigations stretching back to Barnacle III (2014), Annie T (2015), and Enterprise (2017). Each of those investigations found the same gap. Each resulted in guidance. The accidents continued.

What If? — Three Controls That Could Have Changed the Outcome

What if the shooting method genuinely separated the deckhand from the gear? Pre-positioning the end weight before shooting, or modifying the deck to allow pots to deploy without downstacking, would have kept the deckhand away from the back rope entirely.

What if the risk assessment control — crew in wheelhouse during shooting — had been followed? The deckhand could not have been in the path of the back rope if he had been inside. The control existed, was specific, and was not followed.

What if the safety equipment specified in the risk assessment had been on board and in use? A body harness tethered to the vessel might not have prevented entanglement — but it would have prevented the deckhand being carried into the sea and away from the vessel.

For Fishing Vessel Skippers

Your risk assessment is a working instruction. If the control it specifies is not followed in practice, either the practice must change or the risk assessment must be revised to a method that is both safe and actually achievable. You cannot have a risk assessment that says ‘crew in wheelhouse during shooting’ while the deckhand works on deck every time.

Equipment listed in a risk assessment must be on board. A harness in the documentation but not in the locker provides no protection.

Walk your shooting sequence honestly: at what point is your deckhand near the running gear? That is your risk. What physically separates them from it?

For Deckhands

You have a legal duty under MGN 587(F) to comply with the safety measures your skipper has put in place. If the established practice contradicts the documented risk assessment, that is a gap you can raise. If your foot is inside a bight of the running gear during deployment: shout to the skipper immediately, and if there is slack, step clear. Once the rope is under tension at speed, there is no recovery.

Vessel Checklist

Self-shooting assessment: At what point during your shooting sequence is a crew member near the running gear? If the answer is ‘any point’, that is the gap. What physical change would eliminate it?
Risk assessment audit: Are all documented controls followed every time? Is every piece of equipment listed in the risk assessment physically on board?
Training check: Have you completed the Seafish Safety Awareness and Risk Assessment course? If you have 2+ years’ experience and have not, this is mandatory — not guidance.

Test Your Knowledge

Work through the Wilaya scenario and test yourself on skipper and deckhand-level questions at Crew Connect: try a quick safety round.