Lost in 40 Minutes: What the Weston Bay Man Overboard Report Means for Every Potting Crew

12 Miles Southeast of Spurn Head

On 22 May 2024, the potting vessel Weston Bay (GY123) was shooting her pots around 12 nautical miles southeast of Spurn Head when two deckhands went into the water — a double man overboard. The remaining crew managed to recover one of them. Their attempts to recover the second were unsuccessful. He was eventually recovered by another vessel around 40 minutes after entering the water, but was not breathing and could not be resuscitated.

MAIB published its investigation report and an accompanying safety flyer in spring 2026. Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents Rob Loder's findings describe a chain of ordinary, common conditions on a working fishing vessel — not a single dramatic failure, but several gaps that, together, meant that when something went wrong, it went wrong badly, and the crew weren't ready for it.

What Happened: The Factual Record

The investigation found that the method Weston Bay used to shoot her pots did not ensure physical separation between the crew and the running gear. As Chief Inspector Loder put it: "the safety benefits of self-shooting systems are undermined and crew are placed at risk if they need to interact with shooting pots." In other words — a system designed to reduce crew involvement in a hazardous process still required crew to get close to it, and when that happened, there was nothing keeping them safe if things went wrong.

Weston Bay's own risk assessments hadn't identified or addressed this hazard. And when the emergency happened, the crew had not practised man overboard drills — they were, in the investigation's words, unprepared for the emergency. The MOB recovery system on board was found to be in poor condition, and not fit for recovering an unconscious casualty from the water.

Root Causes: Three Gaps That Compounded

1. "Self-Shooting" Didn't Mean "Hands-Off"

Self-shooting pot systems exist to reduce the amount of time crew spend handling gear under tension. But MAIB's finding is a warning against treating that as a complete solution: if the system jams, snags, or needs adjusting — and it will, eventually — someone has to deal with it, often under time pressure, often close to gear that's still under load. A risk assessment that assumes the system always works as intended isn't a risk assessment of the actual job.

2. Drills That Hadn't Happened

An MOB drill isn't really about rehearsing for the rare moment someone goes over the side. It's about making sure that when it happens — in the dark, in a panic, with someone's life depending on speed — the crew's first attempt isn't also their first time. Weston Bay's crew faced a double man overboard with no rehearsal, and the investigation found this contributed to the outcome.

3. Recovery Equipment That Existed but Didn't Work

Having an MOB recovery sling, ladder, or similar device on board satisfies a checklist. Having one that's been checked, maintained, and is actually capable of lifting an unconscious adult out of the water is a different thing entirely — and MAIB found Weston Bay's system fell into the first category, not the second, at exactly the moment it mattered.

What If? — Scenario-Based Escalation

One of Weston Bay's two casualties was recovered. The other was recovered too, but 40 minutes later and too late. Now change a few of those variables.

What if the water temperature had been a few degrees lower, or the second casualty hadn't been wearing a flotation aid? Forty minutes in cold water without flotation is, for most people, not survivable regardless of how quickly they're eventually recovered. The margin in this accident was already desperately thin.

What if only one other vessel had been nearby to assist — or none at all? The second casualty was recovered by another vessel. Without one in range, Weston Bay's own crew — with recovery equipment the investigation found unsuitable for an unconscious person — would have been the only recovery option.