MV WAKASHIO — The Twelve Days Between a Grounding and a Disaster

Six Years Ago Today

On 25 July 2020 — six years to the day before this article was published — the capesize bulk carrier WAKASHIO grounded on a coral reef off Pointe d'Esny, Mauritius, roughly 900 metres from shore. She was in ballast, en route to Brazil, carrying no cargo but 3,894 tonnes of low-sulphur fuel oil, 207 tonnes of diesel and 90 tonnes of lubricant oil in her bunkers.

The grounding itself didn't spill a drop. What happened in the twelve days that followed is the part of this story worth sitting with.

What Actually Caused the Grounding

Panama Maritime Authority's investigation, released three years after the incident, concluded the grounding was “most probably a result of human factor” — and didn't soften what that meant in practice. On the night of the grounding, the Master had attended a crew birthday party and consumed four alcoholic drinks — two whiskies at the party, two more once back on the bridge. He deliberately sailed the ship close to the Mauritius coast specifically to get a mobile phone signal, entering the country's territorial waters without notifying local authorities. The Chief Officer was preoccupied with the same goal — accessing mobile internet — rather than maintaining proper navigational watch. A Cadet Officer was allowed to skip lookout duty to stay at the party. When the ship was 1.5 miles from shore and closing, the Master still hadn't assumed command as required.

The investigation also flagged an absence of large-scale charts on board and over-reliance on an over-zoomed electronic chart display — a navigational picture that looked fine at the zoom level the bridge team had it set to, and wasn't.

The Window That Mattered Most

Here is the detail that gets lost in most retellings: WAKASHIO grounded on 25 July. Oil did not begin leaking from her hull until 6 August — twelve days later. For most of that window, the ship sat on the reef with her fuel still contained, and the question was never really “will she spill” so much as “how much of this is still preventable.”

It wasn't prevented, and the reasons why sit squarely outside the ship herself. Mauritius's national oil spill contingency plan was, by the time it was actually needed, nearly two decades out of date. The National Coast Guard had the vessel visible on radar during her approach and didn't flag the danger. Once the leak began, coordination between authorities was slow and, at points, contradictory — mitigation efforts were delayed by disagreement, not just by circumstance. By 10 August, an estimated 1,000 tonnes had spilled, the slick covered 27 square kilometres, and 5-metre waves had halted cleanup entirely.

Local fishermen, divers and NGOs built floating containment barriers from cloth stuffed with straw and human hair — a genuinely improvised response while formal mechanisms caught up. India, France (via Réunion) and Japan all sent personnel and equipment. On 15 August the ship broke in two. On 31 August, during recovery operations, the tug Sir Gaëtan Duval sank, killing three crew.