The Hook That Would Not Turn: Viyada Naree, a Rolling Ship and a Permit That Said Clear Weather

What Happened

On 19 January 2026 VIYADA NAREE left a shipyard after dry-docking. The No. 2 crane block had been overhauled there, with new sheave bearings, block guard, bolts and nuts, but not the swivel hook, so nobody tested the hook. Before departure it was found difficult to turn. Once at sea the Chief Officer and Bosun confirmed it was jammed.

The Chief Officer planned to disconnect the hook and lubricate it. He told the Second Engineer, whose help he wanted, that the crane would be needed for loading at a Chinese or Korean port within a few days, so there was urgency. At 0830 a permit to work for working aloft was completed by the Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer, who was also the Safety Officer, and approved by the Master. The work was on the No. 1 crane mast house top platform, about 2.7 m above the main deck. At 0910 the Chief Officer held a toolbox meeting and risk assessment with five crew. The sea was judged steady, with occasional slight rolling.

At about 0928 the swivel hook and two D-shackles were off the block. The Chief Officer, Bosun and fitter were trying to secure the block to the platform with a chain block and slings when the sea changed. Moderate swells of up to about 1.5 m began to roll the ship, and the hook, shackles and chain block started to slide on the platform. They fell onto the port side main deck. The fitter was injured. The Second Engineer, who had looked at the job and left, was found lying unconscious on the deck below, his helmet three metres away.

The Chief Officer asked the bridge to alter heading to reduce the rolling. The ship was in the precautionary area of a traffic separation scheme with traffic from several directions, and the Third Officer could alter heading only when the traffic allowed. CPR continued for hours as the ship was directed to an anchorage for medical evacuation. The Second Engineer died at about 1630. The cause of death was haemorrhage from blunt force injury to the left neck and base of the skull.

What The Investigation Found

1. The weather was assessed as ‘very low risk’ and not revisited. The permit relied on ‘clear weather’, which the SMS did not define. The crew understood occasional slight rolling to be clear weather. When conditions deteriorated to moderate sea, nothing in the plan said stop, and the hook had not been secured before it was disconnected.
2. The heading option was not planned. Altering course to reduce rolling was the obvious remedy, but it was not discussed with the bridge beforehand, and the traffic in the TSS area then limited it.
3. The warning signs and barriers were ticked but not there. The permit’s ‘warning notices posted’ box said yes. At the worksite there were no notices and no physical barrier to stop crew walking along the main deck below.
4. Stop-work authority was too narrow. The SMS allowed only the Safety Officer to stop work he believed could cause a serious accident, and he was not at the worksite. The report says it was impractical for him to be present at every job, and that any crew member should be able to stop work.
5. The hook was never functionally tested after the overhaul, and the overhaul was not made known to the class surveyor, who therefore did only a visual examination and load test. A chance to find the jammed hook in the yard was missed.
6. The Second Engineer’s helmet had no chinstrap. The report does not conclude that a chinstrap would have changed the outcome, since the type and certification of the helmet could not be assessed.

Rest records for the Second Engineer showed 12 hours of rest in the previous 24 and 95 in the previous seven days. Fatigue was not an issue in this case.

Recommendations And Company Actions

1. TSIB recommended that the manager ensure a functional test is carried out after a crane block is overhauled or components are renewed, and that the class society is notified of such work.
2. TSIB recommended that safety helmets used by crew have chinstraps and are worn properly.
3. The company issued a fleet safety alert on preventing falling objects from mast house tops, suspended working at height and crane maintenance whenever its ships roll or pitch, and required temporary exclusion zones with physical barriers, signs and briefings.
4. It also required that dismantled or partly disconnected crane hooks, blocks and shackles are secured with secondary restraints at every stage, and ordered a review of the permit to work system.