Scot Carrier Collides with Karin Høj in Bornholmsgat — Barge Capsizes, Two Crew Die

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Scot Carrier's second officer had been alone on the bridge, using a tablet computer continuously throughout his watch, and had consumed alcohol before taking it over. Neither vessel had a dedicated lookout posted — not unusual for the hour, but a direct breach of COLREGs Rule 5, which requires a proper lookout by sight and hearing at all times. At a planned ECDIS waypoint, the second officer altered course from 220° to 270° without scanning radar or taking a visual check for traffic in the new heading. Karin Høj was there. Scot Carrier struck it.

Karin Høj had no voyage data recorder and no survivors, so the investigation could establish nothing about its crew's actions before the collision. What is certain is the outcome: the barge capsized. Both crew members lost their lives.

The Second Failure

What makes this case unusual is what happened immediately afterwards. The second officer did not raise the alarm. He did not call the master. He returned Scot Carrier to its original course and speed, as if nothing had happened. The first anyone outside the ship knew something was wrong was 17 minutes later, when the Swedish Coast Guard queried Scot Carrier's irregular AIS track by VHF. Only then was the master alerted.

What an ECDIS Waypoint Actually Tells You

An ECDIS-planned waypoint tells you where to turn. It does not tell you whether it's safe to turn there. The second officer's course alteration at 270° was executed without any independent check of the traffic picture — no radar scan, no visual bearings, no AIS cross-check. Combined with a tablet computer that had held his attention for the entire watch and alcohol already in his system, the investigation found no effective lookout was being maintained in any sense the regulations recognise.

Recommended Actions

MAIB Report 5/2023 recommended the MCA clarify the requirement for a dedicated lookout during hours of darkness, specifically for ships in UK waters and UK-registered ships — closing a gap the investigation found had allowed "a single watchkeeper, however qualified" to be treated as meeting the lookout requirement. The report's findings point every operator toward the same practical actions:

1. Confirm standing orders require a dedicated lookout for all hours of darkness — and that it's actually implemented on watch, not just written down
2. Set and brief a clear policy on personal electronic devices on the bridge during watch — if none exists, create one
3. Ensure the SMS's alcohol policy is understood and actively managed, not just documented
4. Require a radar scan and visual/AIS check for traffic before every course alteration at a planned waypoint — an ECDIS waypoint is a navigational prompt, not a clearance
5. Make immediate reporting after any collision or suspected collision an absolute standing order: raise the alarm, call the master, stop or manoeuvre to assist

Human Element Analysis