All Sectors

One Open Valve: What the Capsize of Njord Tells Every Fishing Vessel Skipper About Stability

🕑 5 min read words Safety • Incident

150 Miles North-East of Peterhead, 6 March 2022 — 1330

The haul was the biggest the crew of Njord had ever seen. Somewhere between 700 and 750 boxes of haddock, whiting, and saithe. They had shot over a gas pipeline in the Norwegian sector and hauled back a catch that, in a different set of circumstances, would have been the story of the trip home. Instead it was the last haul the vessel ever made.

Njord (SH 90) was a 26.56-metre steel stern trawler, built in 1992, registered at Scarborough, crewed by eight. In 2021 she had undergone significant modifications: a twin-rig conversion, a new trawl winch, additional net drums, an ice-making machine, and new gantry steelwork. None of these had been notified to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. No naval architect had assessed their effect on stability. The vessel's stability book was calculated for a vessel 5.165 tonnes lighter than Njord had become.

The net was secured to the starboard trawl winch. Fish weight was acting on a handrail well above the vessel's centre of gravity. Njord developed a starboard list. In the aft bulkhead of the starboard passageway, a 50mm drain valve was open — fitted to allow deck drainage in port, left open at sea. As the list reached approximately 17.2°, the sea reached the drain hole. Downflooding began. The list increased. More water entered.

At 1330, Njord capsized. She sank a short time later.

All eight crew abandoned to the upturned hull. Njord's EPIRB auto-activated and signalled the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre. A SAR helicopter scrambled from 45 nautical miles away. But by the time it arrived, Njord had sunk. All eight crew were in the water. Neither liferaft had surfaced — both were trapped beneath the inverted hull.

The SAR helicopter and a fast rescue craft from the nearby vessel Olympic Challenger rescued seven crew. Ronald MacKinnon, 56, deckhand, entered the water without a personal flotation device. The helicopter's medic worked on him. His heart would not restart. He drowned.

What the Investigation Found

The Valve

Without the open drain valve, Njord's downflooding angle was 46°. With it open, the downflooding angle was approximately 17.2°. That is the distance between surviving and not: a single 50mm valve in a weathertight bulkhead, left open.

The hole had been cut to allow the passageway to drain when the vessel was alongside. It was a reasonable modification for that purpose. At sea, a weathertight bulkhead is only weathertight when the valve is closed. The MAIB found no pre-departure checklist item requiring its closure. Nobody checked.

The Modifications

Between 2018 and 2021, the additions to Njord — new winch, drums, ice machine, gantry — added 5.165 tonnes to her lightship displacement and shifted her centre of gravity upward. The change in lightship was 1.94% — just below the 2% threshold that would have mandated a new inclining experiment under MSN 1873(F) Amendment 1.

But the modification was never notified. No threshold was assessed. The stability book in use on the day Njord capsized was calculated for the vessel as she had been in 2018. The crew were operating with a stability margin they believed existed, using data that no longer described their vessel.

Post-modification analysis by the MAIB showed that Njord failed stability condition 7 after the modifications. The vessel that went to sea on 6 March 2022 would not have passed the stability assessment she was assumed to have passed.

The Loading

Njord's stability book assumed 25 tonnes of ice and a maximum 4 tonnes in the fish hopper. On 6 March the vessel carried 12.5 tonnes of ice and the hopper held approximately 10 tonnes — two and a half times its assumed maximum. Nobody had computed the combined loading before the haul was secured. The stability book contained the information. The assumptions were known. The arithmetic was not done.

The MAIB was clear: it is almost certain that Njord would not have capsized had the vessel been operated in line with the assumptions made in the stability book.

The Catch

Seven hundred boxes. The largest catch the crew had ever seen. The catch was handled the same way every catch is handled: hauled, secured to the winch, processed. The weight was acting on a handrail above the vessel's centre of gravity — a high-side loading that generates list rather than trim. Nobody paused to calculate whether the combined effect of that catch, the overloaded hopper, the reduced ice, and the reduced stability margin had pushed the vessel outside safe operating limits.

The MAIB noted the crew share system: fishermen paid a percentage of catch value have a direct financial interest in maximising the haul. This is not a cause of capsizes. But it is a recognised background pressure that can suppress the instinct to challenge an unusual loading decision. An exceptionally large catch is precisely the moment to pause and do the arithmetic — and it is precisely the moment when the commercial incentive not to is strongest.

The Emergency

When Njord capsized, none of the crew were wearing personal flotation devices. Working lifejackets, immersion suits, and abandon-ship lifejackets were stored below decks. Once the vessel inverted, they were inaccessible. Ronald MacKinnon entered 8°C water in the North Sea in March without buoyancy.

The liferafts did not surface. Both were trapped beneath the inverted structure and then lost buoyancy as the vessel sank. The same failure had occurred on Sarah Jayne in 2008 and Joanna C in 2020. A hydrostatic release activates at the correct depth. It cannot overcome a physical obstruction.

The skipper tried to make a Mayday call on the vessel's handheld VHF. The battery failed immediately. It had been continuously charged contrary to the manufacturer's instructions — continuous charging had degraded it. There was no Mayday.

The EPIRB worked. It auto-activated, floated free, and signalled the JRCC. Without it, the MAIB concluded, all eight crew would likely have perished.

What If?

What if the drain valve had been closed? Njord's downflooding angle would have been 46°. The list caused by the catch weight would not have reached downflooding. The vessel would have recovered. The haul would have been processed. The crew would have gone home.

What if the modifications had been notified to the MCA? A naval architect would have assessed the stability impact. The MCA would have either approved the modifications with conditions or required a new inclining experiment. The skipper and crew would have had an accurate picture of their vessel's stability margins. They might have been fishing differently.

What if the stability book assumptions had been checked before the haul? The hopper was 2.5 times over its assumed maximum. The ice was running at half the assumed weight. If anyone had compared actual loading against the book before the catch was secured, the combination of factors that caused the capsize might have been identified before the vessel listed to a critical angle.

What if lifejackets had been on the working deck? Ronald MacKinnon would have had buoyancy when he entered the water. He might have survived.

For Fishing Vessel Skippers

Your stability book is not a document on the shelf. It is a set of operational limits. The ice quantity on your vessel, the load in your fish hopper, the weight and position of your catch — these are variables the stability book was designed around. Operating outside them removes the safety margin the calculations provide. Doing the arithmetic is not paperwork. It is seamanship.

Any modification to your vessel — a new winch, an ice machine, extra drums, structural steelwork — must be reported to the MCA before you go back to sea. Not after. MSN 1873(F) Amendment 1 makes this a legal requirement. The stability book is only valid for the vessel as it was when the book was written.

For All Fishing Vessel Crew

Before the next trip: find out where the lifejackets are stowed and whether you can reach them in 30 seconds from the working deck. Njord's crew could not. Consider whether abandon-ship lifejackets should be in a box on the working deck — the MAIB safety flyer issued after Njord specifically recommends this.

Before departure: check that drain valves in weathertight bulkheads are closed. A 50mm hole at 17 degrees of list is all it takes.

Vessel Checklist

Stability book assumptions: Are you operating within the ice, hopper, and catch loading assumptions? When did you last check?
Modifications: Have any modifications been made since the last stability assessment? Have they been notified to the MCA?
Drain valves: Are all drain valves in weathertight bulkheads on your pre-departure checklist? Are they closed before sailing?
PFD accessibility: Can crew reach lifejackets from the working deck without going below? Is there a working-deck stowage option?
Liferaft stowage: Is there anything obstructing the liferafts that would prevent float-free deployment? When were the hydrostatic releases last serviced?
EPIRB: Float-free bracket fitted? Battery in date? Registered with MCA Beacon Registry?
Handheld VHF: Batteries tested under load recently? Not continuously charged?

Test Your Knowledge

Try a fishing vessel safety knowledge check at Crew Connect — stability, downflooding, and emergency preparedness questions from this investigation.