The Trailer That Shouldn't Have Moved: What the Laureline Fatal Crush Means for Every RoRo Crew Member

Purfleet, 13 July 2024 — 5:11 pm

Able Seaman Alain Canete had scored 100% in his vehicle deck safety training exam six weeks earlier. He knew the new danger zone procedure. He had passed every assessment his company had put in front of him.

At 17:11 on 13 July 2024, he was crushed between the rear of a reversing trailer and the structure of the RoRo cargo vessel Laureline, moored at the CLdN London terminal in Purfleet. He was declared dead at 17:35.

MAIB Report 7/2026 describes how a 44-year-old Filipino AB, with years of experience on ro-ro vessels, died in circumstances that had played out, in near-identical form, on at least four other ro-ro vessels in the preceding seven years — including a fatal crush on board Clipper Pennant just three years earlier. The procedure designed to prevent it existed. The training had been delivered. The exam had been passed. None of it was enough.

What Happened: The Sequence

Loading operations on Laureline's garage deck were being managed by two ABs — AB1 (Canete) and AB2 — working independently on opposite sides of the deck. A fleet of terminal tugs driven by shore-based tug drivers were loading road trailers into stowage positions under the crew's direction.

At around 17:06, AB2 was relashing a trailer (trailer A) on the starboard side. AB1 was on the port side, working in the narrow space between the ventilation trunking at the aft end of the deck and a stowed trailer (trailer C).

A second tug and trailer (trailer B) arrived and waited. AB1 waved it forward and began walking ahead of it as the tug driver pushed it into the aft loading position. As the tug manoeuvred, AB1 positioned himself in a corner between the vent trunking and trailer C — a position the investigation later confirmed the tug driver could not see without leaning out of his cab window.

The tug paused for about 5 seconds. AB1, believing the trailer had stopped in position and the manoeuvre was complete, stepped behind it. The tug driver — reassessing the trailer's alignment against trailer C — pushed back without checking that AB1 had cleared. Trailer B struck the vent trunking and AB1.

The gap between the rear of trailer C and trailer B when found post-accident was 20.6 centimetres.

Root Causes: Three Failures That Stacked

1. A Safety Procedure That Was Unclear and Not Followed

Anglo-Eastern had introduced a new vehicle deck cargo operations procedure (Section 4.7 of its RoRo and Car Carrier Operations Manual) just three months before the accident, following a separate internal incident. The procedure defined a moving danger zone around each manoeuvring trailer — an 8-page document with diagrams, rules, and exceptions.

The MAIB found that the procedure's safety messages were undermined by their own complexity. Alongside the core rule to stay out of the danger zone, there were listed exceptions (inserting trestles, releasing parking brakes, placing rubber mats). CCTV footage from the two weeks before the accident showed garage deck ABs routinely entering the danger zone behind connected, moving trailers — not as a one-off lapse, but as standard working practice.

AB1 and AB2 had both scored above 96% in their training assessment. The exam did not contain a single question about the danger zone or an explicit instruction not to pass behind a connected trailer. Training that tests knowledge retention without testing application in practice is not training in the skill that matters.

2. A Tug Driver Procedure That Didn't Reflect Reality

Both industry guidance (ILO) and the terminal's own safe system of work stated clearly: if you lose sight of the banksman, stop. The tug driver had attended toolbox talks reinforcing this, as recently as November 2023.

MAIB's review of CCTV footage across Laureline's garage deck in the two weeks before the accident found that tug drivers routinely continued manoeuvring when the marshalling crew member was not in their line of sight. This was not occasional non-compliance — it reflected the physical reality of the task: the geometry of a coupled tug and trailer, in a narrow loading lane, with a driver focused on lane positioning and proximity to adjacent vehicles, made maintaining continuous sight of the banksman practically impossible.

The procedure said stop if you can't see them. The operation, as actually performed, made it routine to not see them. The gap between rule and reality was never addressed.

3. No Supervision on the Deck Where the Accident Happened

On the day of the accident, three of Laureline's four vehicle decks were being worked with two ABs each and no supervisory officer present. The main deck had the bosun as a third crew member. The garage deck — the deck where the accident happened — had only AB1 and AB2, working independently on opposite sides, out of each other's sight.

The MAIB's CCTV comparison is stark: on the main deck where the bosun was present, crew consistently stayed clear of danger zones. On the garage deck without supervision, they routinely did not. The First Officer was in the cargo control room, focused on ballast and trim. The CCTV had limited views of the garage deck. No one was watching.

Anglo-Eastern had introduced the new procedure without any assurance mechanism — no way to verify that the training had been understood and the procedure was being followed. The terminal had audited Laureline's weather deck operations once, found no issues, and had not audited the garage deck before the accident.