ÎLE DE GROIX / ACADIE: Two Ferries, One Narrow Channel, Zero Radio Calls

Port of Lorient, 8 April 2013 — 07:39

Two car ferries, both belonging to the same operator, running the same short Lorient–Groix crossing. ACADIE left Port-Tudy at 07:00 with 89 passengers, in clear conditions that turned to thick fog partway across. ÎLE DE GROIX left the Lorient ferry terminal at 07:30 with 52 passengers, 8 crew, and a mix of cars and trucks — fog thick from the moment she cleared the berth. Both vessels reduced speed, both had radar running, both sounded their fog signal. Both, in line with company instructions for fog, had a crewman posted forward as an extra lookout.

What Happened

ÎLE DE GROIX's captain picked up ACADIE on radar near the Banc du Turc and told his helmsman to come right slightly. He then raised ACADIE — not by calling the bridge on VHF, but via a handheld radio exchange that a deckhand happened to answer, warning that ACADIE was running too far to the left of the channel. On the strength of that one relayed exchange, he gave a further course correction to starboard. ACADIE's captain, for his part, had ÎLE DE GROIX on radar too, plotted ahead of him — and having just had the handheld exchange, didn't call back to confirm anything further. He went to check his own helmsman was holding the ordered course and continued on. Neither captain spoke to the other directly, bridge to bridge, at any point before the two vessels came out of the fog facing each other, in one of the tightest stretches of the channel — barely 200 metres wide — and collided head-on at 07:39.

What the Investigation Found

Both vessels had radars with functioning alarms — neither had the alarm switched on. Only the captains on each vessel were trained to operate the radar. Both vessels were making higher speed than the fog and the confined channel really allowed. And the crewmen posted forward as fog lookouts — following the company's own standing instructions — had to abandon their positions and shelter behind the windlass moments before impact, which BEAmer flagged as a real safety risk in its own right: posting a lookout somewhere that becomes dangerous the moment a collision looks likely defeats the purpose.

What Changed

The operator issued new navigation directives for the two identified pinch points in the channel within a week. Ferry schedules were adjusted from 1 July 2013 specifically to avoid the two vessels crossing in those zones at all. The Port of Lorient went further, banning crossings in the incriminated zone entirely whenever visibility drops below 700 metres — a real, lasting regulatory response to this exact near-disaster.

Check Your Vessel

• Masters: When you have another vessel identified on radar in restricted visibility, is a direct bridge-to-bridge VHF call your standard practice, or would a single relayed message from a crew member be enough for you to stop actively monitoring the situation?
• All crew: Is your vessel's speed genuinely matched to visibility and the width of water available, or just to the schedule?
• Officers: If your company posts lookouts forward in fog, is there an actual plan for where they retreat to if a collision becomes imminent — or would they be caught in the open, the way both crews were here?

Source: BEAmer (Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Événements de Mer, France) — Rapport d'enquête simplifié, Abordage entre les transbordeurs ÎLE DE GROIX et ACADIE, 8 April 2013, published November 2013.