GWENVIDIK / LE SQUALE II: The Collision That Happened Because Nobody Was Watching

Pointe de Penmarch, 25 November 2013 — 14:56

Two trawlers, both out of Le Guilvinec, both well maintained, both working an ordinary Monday. LE SQUALE II — two crew, trawling at 3 knots, heading south-east — had her skipper and deckhand on the after deck sorting the catch, with the skipper telling BEAmer's investigators he was checking the surrounding water regularly. GWENVIDIK — three crew — was heading home at 8 knots on a steady course of 053°, her skipper due ashore that afternoon for his own medical certificate renewal.

What Happened

GWENVIDIK's skipper checked his radar, saw no returns, stayed briefly on the bridge, then went down to the deck to help his crew sort fish. Nobody remained at the helm or on watch. Making a steady 8 knots on a straight course, GWENVIDIK ran directly into LE SQUALE II's starboard side, just aft of her bow. LE SQUALE II took on water immediately and began sinking fast; her hull later broke apart and she was never recovered, though her 5.6 tonnes of diesel and 100 litres of oil caused no significant pollution. GWENVIDIK's skipper got back to the bridge the moment he felt the impact and manoeuvred to recover LE SQUALE II's crew from the water as she went down — GWENVIDIK herself came away with only minor damage, a single burst hull plank about a metre long. CROSS Étel was alerted within a minute; both crew were recovered safely.

What the Investigation Found

There's no ambiguity in BEAmer's account of what happened: GWENVIDIK's skipper left the bridge unattended, on a steady course, in clear conditions with 13 miles of visibility, and no lookout was kept for the several minutes he was below helping sort the catch. LE SQUALE II's skipper was on deck too, but working, not stationed to watch continuously — and in any case, the give-way responsibility in this encounter sat with the vessel that could see the other and simply wasn't looking. BEAmer's conclusion is blunt: this collision, and the loss of LE SQUALE II, is the direct result of a lookout failure aboard both vessels.

One detail matters beyond the headline finding. GWENVIDIK was fitted with a radar anti-collision alarm, and it did activate — but nobody heard it, because the only people aboard were aft on deck, away from the wheelhouse. LE SQUALE II's equivalent alarm wasn't even switched on. BEAmer's own lesson from this is pointed: an anti-collision alarm only supports Rule 5 if someone is actually in a position to hear it. A working alarm in an empty wheelhouse achieves nothing.

The Real Lesson

This isn't a story about equipment failure, bad weather, or an unforeseeable mechanical fault. A radar check that shows nothing nearby is a snapshot, not a standing guarantee — vessels move, and the picture changes the moment you stop watching it. On a short-handed fishing vessel, the pull to help sort the catch, tend gear, or handle any of a dozen other jobs on deck is constant and completely understandable. BEAmer's own account makes clear that pull is exactly what put GWENVIDIK on a collision course with no one aware it was happening — and that having an alarm fitted isn't the same as having a lookout kept.

BEAmer also drew a separate, structural lesson from LE SQUALE II's loss: her hull had no watertight subdivision, so a single breach aft of the forecastle was enough to flood and sink her entirely. The report explicitly cross-references three other BEAmer investigations — LE PETIT COMÉDIEN, LA LICORNE, and FLORENCE DOMINIQUE — where the same lack of compartmentalisation on a small trawler let one hull breach become a total loss. It's a recurring finding this pipeline has flagged before: on vessels this size, a single open hold or unsubdivided hull turns one bad moment into a sinking, when a bulkhead might have contained it.

Check Your Vessel

• Skippers: Before leaving the bridge for any reason — sorting catch, engine checks, anything — do you have an actual plan for who (if anyone) is keeping watch while you're away, or does the bridge simply go unattended?
• Deckhands: If you're the only other person aboard and the skipper leaves the bridge, do you know that watching the water is now genuinely your job too, not just his?
• All crew: A clear radar picture and clear visibility are not the same as an actual lookout being kept — do you treat 'nothing on radar a moment ago' as equivalent to 'nothing there now'?
• Owners: Is your collision alarm actually audible from wherever crew are likely to be working, or only from an empty wheelhouse?

Source: BEAmer (Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Événements de Mer, France) — Rapport d'enquête simplifié, Abordage entre les chalutiers GWENVIDIK et LE SQUALE II, 25 November 2013, published November 2014.