Close All Sea Valves: What Freedom II Teaches Fishing Crews About Flood Response

The Pump That Wasn't Pumping

At around 0400 on 21 February 2024, the prawn trawler Freedom II left Crinan to fish the Firth of Lorn. She was 49 years old, wooden-hulled, and carried more installed bilge pump capacity than the regulations required. By mid-afternoon she was on the seabed.

At about 1000, while hauling gear, the skipper felt a strong vibration through the propeller shaft — the kind Freedom II had produced before when the propeller fouled. He pulsed the engine ahead and astern to clear it. It didn't clear. He turned for Oban at slow speed, planning running repairs.

Half an hour or so later, a deckhand went to start the deck wash pump. Nothing came out. The skipper checked the engine room and found the bilge alarms already active, water rising. He concluded the source was the propeller shaft stern seal — the failure he already had in mind from the morning's vibration. He was wrong. The real source was a roughly 1-metre length of unsupported copper alloy pipe, running from a sea cock in the hull to the deck wash pump, mounted rigidly against a flexibly-mounted engine with no flexible coupling in between. Hours of vibration that morning had fatigue-fractured it.

What Should Have Happened Next

MAIB Report 8/2026 is unambiguous on this point: MGN 165(F) instructs crews to shut the relevant sea valve immediately on discovering flooding — and if the source can't be identified, to close all sea valves until the flooding stops. Freedom II's valves had even been modified for access from above the floor plates, precisely so this could be done quickly. No valve was closed. The skipper's diagnosis of the stern seal was never revisited.

As the water rose, the response degraded further. The auxiliary generator wouldn't start because water had splashed onto its control panel. The portable salvage pump's starting cord snapped when it was repositioned. VHF voice calls to the coastguard went unanswered for roughly 45 minutes in an area of known poor signal — because the skipper hadn't activated the boat's DSC distress alert, believing (mistakenly, in the investigation's assessment) that the vessel wasn't yet in "grave and imminent danger."

The Fish Hold Nobody Checked Again

When the Oban RNLI all-weather lifeboat arrived and took Freedom II under tow, two of the four crew were transferred aboard the ALB. The skipper reported that the flooding had slowed. It hadn't — the water had simply spread into the fish hold, which had been checked once, early on, and found dry, then never checked again. The free surface of water spanning both compartments was quietly destroying the vessel's stability. The ALB carried a 47m³/hr salvage pump of its own; it wasn't transferred on arrival because conditions looked too rough, and the decision was never revisited once the vessels reached the sheltered water by the Garvellach Islands.

At 1535, Freedom II lolled suddenly to port and foundered. The skipper and one deckhand went into the water and were recovered by the lifeboat, uninjured. No new MAIB recommendations were issued — the systemic issues (pipework vibration guidance, flood drill standards) were already being addressed following two related investigations, into Opportune (MAIB 3/2026) and Guiding Light/Guiding Star (MAIB 13/2024).

Recommended Actions

No new MAIB recommendations were issued for this specific report — the systemic gaps it exposed were already being addressed through the Opportune (MAIB 3/2026) and Guiding Light/Guiding Star (MAIB 13/2024) investigations. The practical actions the report itself points every fishing crew toward:

1. When flooding is discovered and the source isn't immediately obvious, close all sea valves first — don't wait to confirm a diagnosis (MGN 165(F), Section 7)
2. Inspect any seawater suction or cooling pipe connected directly to a flexibly-mounted engine for a flexible coupling or bellows section, and for independent pipe support (MGN 190(F); SAN 29)
3. Test every bilge pump — including the portable salvage pump's starting cord and fuel — on a weekly basis, not just before survey
4. Use the DSC distress function as soon as an uncontrolled emergency is confirmed, particularly in known poor-VHF-coverage areas — don't wait for certainty that the vessel is sinking
5. During any flooding event, check every compartment at regular intervals, including spaces that share a bulkhead with the flooded space — a slowing rate of rise in one compartment can mean water is spreading, not receding