Alone on the Bridge: Exxon Valdez and Bligh Reef

One Officer, One Stretch of Water He Wasn't Certified to Navigate Alone

Late on 23 March 1989, Exxon Valdez departed Valdez, Alaska, loaded with crude oil bound for California. To avoid ice from the Columbia Glacier, Captain Joseph Hazelwood ordered a course change taking the ship outside the normal shipping lane, then left the bridge, instructing Third Mate Gregory Cousins to turn the vessel back into the lane at a specific point. Cousins was alone on the bridge — without the helmsman/lookout redundancy normally expected, and not legally qualified or experienced enough to be navigating this stretch of Prince William Sound without a pilot or the Master present.

Fatigue, and a Delayed Turn

Cousins had had as little as four hours' sleep before starting work that day, with only a brief afternoon nap, and had likely been awake and working for up to eighteen hours by the time of the grounding. As the ship approached the point where the turn back into the shipping lane was required, he delayed — NTSB investigators found he waited more than six minutes longer than necessary before finally ordering a sharp turn to starboard, by which point it was too late.

What the Investigation Found

The NTSB's investigation identified the probable cause as the fatigued third mate's failure to properly manoeuvre the vessel, compounded by the captain's failure to provide a proper navigation watch — Hazelwood had been drinking ashore before departure and was not on the bridge for the passage through this stretch of water. Contributing causes named in the report included Exxon's failure to provide a fit master and a rested, sufficient crew, the US Coast Guard's failure to maintain an effective Vessel Traffic Service monitoring the vessel's position, and the lack of effective pilotage for this part of the transit.

Recommended Actions

1. A qualified officer or pilot must remain on the bridge for any transit of a restricted or hazardous stretch of water — not a single officer alone, regardless of seniority
2. Crewing and scheduling policies must not create conditions of debilitating fatigue among watchkeeping officers
3. A Master's fitness for duty, including alcohol, must be assured before getting underway, with a clear procedure for other officers to act if it is in doubt
4. Vessel Traffic Service monitoring must be resourced and maintained well enough to detect a vessel drifting from its charted track in time to intervene
5. Effective pilotage or equivalent local-knowledge support should remain available for restricted waters, even after a vessel has technically dropped its pilot