Numerous Opportunities: El Faro and Hurricane Joaquin

A Twelve-Hour-Old Forecast

El Faro sailed from Jacksonville, Florida for San Juan, Puerto Rico on 29 September 2015, on her usual route, as Hurricane Joaquin was developing in the Atlantic. Captain Michael Davidson planned his route based on a weather forecast package projecting the storm would take a sharp northward turn before reaching the Bahamas — and held to that plan even as the hours passed and the information in hand grew steadily more out of date, in places relying on a forecast package roughly twelve hours old.

Mates Raised It. The Captain Held Course.

As conditions worsened overnight, officers on watch raised the option of diverting further west, into the Old Bahamas Channel, for more sea room and a later, safer transit. Recovered voyage data recorder audio shows the crew's concerns expressed in hedging, indirect language rather than a direct challenge to the Master's plan. Davidson did not change course.

Propulsion Lost, Water Coming In

By the early hours of 1 October, El Faro had taken a severe list. The main engine's lube oil sump lost suction as the list increased, and propulsion was lost. Water began entering a cargo hold through an open scuttle, and downflooding developed through ventilation closures elsewhere on the ship. The crew's chances, already reduced by the loss of propulsion in hurricane-force conditions, were reduced further by the ship's survival craft: open, uncovered lifeboats, which met carriage requirements but were never going to be usable in these conditions.

What the Investigation Found

The NTSB concluded the sinking “was caused by the captain's failure to avoid sailing into a hurricane, despite numerous opportunities to route the vessel away from the hazardous weather.” Contributing safety issues named in the report included the captain's use of non-current weather information, a late decision to muster the crew, ineffective bridge resource management, and inadequate oversight from the vessel's operator, TOTE Maritime, whose safety management system did not intervene in the routing decision as the storm developed.

Recommended Actions

1. Use current, verified weather information when routing near a tropical system — check the currency of a forecast package before relying on it, not just its content
2. A structured Bridge Resource Management process that empowers officers to challenge a Master's routing decision directly, with an unambiguous means to escalate a genuine safety concern
3. Company oversight of a vessel's routing decisions near severe weather should be active, not left solely to the Master's judgement once underway
4. Vessels on routes exposed to tropical storm risk should be fitted with enclosed lifeboats, not open ones
5. A documented, drilled damage control plan for flooding scenarios, including cargo hold ventilation closures, should be in place before it's needed