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The Last Wave: What the Double Fatality on Calypso 2 Tells Every Excursion Skipper About Ground Seas, PFDs, and Saying No

🕑 5 min read words Safety • Incident

Vessel: Calypso 2, 11.06m GRP excursion vessel
Date & location: 11 March 2023, a cove near West End, Anguilla
Outcome: Swamped by ground seas and driven into cliffs. Two dead — a tourist and the mate, both able swimmers who lost consciousness in the water
Human factors: Situational Awareness · Normalisation · Missing Safety Management
Source: MAIB Report 6/2025

8 decision nodes4 outcome paths — checked / unchecked warning~7 min read + Knowledge Checker

Rendezvous Bay, Anguilla — 11 March 2023

A 4-hour island excursion, postponed a day for weather, finally departed on 11 March in fine, clear conditions with slight seas on the south coast. The experienced skipper rounded the island's western tip and turned north, providing running commentary from the doorway of the helm canopy rather than standing at the wheel. At approximately 1006, Calypso 2 entered a cove near West End, home to a well-known limestone arch. A large wave struck the starboard side and swamped the vessel. A second wave followed immediately. Everyone went overboard. No one was wearing a PFD.

What Ground Seas Are — and Why They Were Already There

Ground seas are swells generated by distant North Atlantic storms, unrelated to local Caribbean weather. A surf warning had been issued on 8 March for Anguilla's northern coastline — dangerous surf over 3 metres, high risk to life. It was still valid on 11 March. MAIB found no evidence the operator or skipper had checked for or considered it. Both charts carried aboard the vessel held enough information to flag the hazard at that exact coastline. It was never assessed.

Recommended Actions

  1. CCL to establish a documented SMS covering domestic excursion vessels, with written weather limits and route risk assessment (per MAIB findings on SCV Code compliance)
  2. Mandatory PFD-wearing policy for excursions into elevated sea-state areas, briefed to passengers before departure
  3. Written helm-watch rule defining when the helm may be left unmanned and by whom
  4. AMASR to close the AIS compliance gap flagged at the vessel's prior inspection and not resolved

Human Element Analysis

Situational Awareness

MAIB concluded the skipper likely became distracted by the commentary and did not realise how close the vessel was to shore. Engine data showed both engines in neutral or stopped at the moment of swamping — inconsistent with any evasive manoeuvring, despite highly manoeuvrable twin 350hp outboards being available.

Normalisation

The excursion had already been postponed once for weather. Rescheduling it a day later, into a still-active surf warning, without re-checking conditions, reflects a decision made against the memory of yesterday's cancellation rather than today's actual hazard.

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