BSafe Case Study 22 — A Standby Engine Order, Given, Then Undone

A Condition of Class, and a Pilot's Reminder

Ship A had recently lost its port anchor in heavy weather and hadn't yet fitted a replacement — its classification society had issued a Condition of Class specifically requiring the main engine to stay on standby while at anchor as a result. Deteriorating weather forced an abandoned bunkering attempt and a diversion to a different anchorage. Before anchoring the second time, the master noticed his own ship had already dragged anchor once that evening. On departure, the attending pilot explicitly advised the master to stay vigilant and keep the engine on standby.

The Instruction Didn't Survive the Pilot Leaving

Shortly after the pilot disembarked, the master ordered the engine stopped anyway and handed the anchor watch to the second officer — with no specific instruction to watch the weather closely. The second officer, once on watch, moved on to administrative tasks. A research vessel was anchored three cables to the northwest.

At 0246, Ship A began dragging anchor. The second officer didn't recognise it for nine minutes. Once he did, the master was notified immediately, the duty engineer called to start the main engine, and an AB sent forward to inspect the cable. The research vessel radioed a warning that Ship A was dragging directly toward it; VTS also transmitted warnings to both vessels. Despite attempts to start the engine and use the bow thruster, Ship A's stern collided with the research vessel's bow at 0312. The two vessels remained entangled by the research vessel's anchor chain, and wind and tide then drove them both toward a third vessel — a sister ship from the same company, also at anchor nearby, which had itself dragged anchor earlier that same evening. Despite VTS's warning and the third vessel's attempt to weigh anchor and engage astern propulsion, Ship A collided with it too, at 0320.

What This Illustrates

• A safety-critical instruction — engine on standby — was given twice, by the classification society's own condition and then again by the pilot, and overridden within a short time of the pilot leaving, with no recorded reason.
• The watch handover to the second officer carried no specific instruction to actively monitor the deteriorating weather situation, despite the ship having already dragged once that night.
• It took nine minutes for the second officer to recognise the ship was dragging anchor — a real gap in vigilance during exactly the period a heightened watch was most needed.
• A sister vessel from the same company had independently dragged anchor earlier the same evening in the same weather — a pattern that, in hindsight, should have raised the alarm for every vessel in the area, not just the ones directly involved.

Recommended Actions

Grounded directly in what MAIB's investigation found:

1. A Condition of Class or pilot's specific instruction needs to be treated as a standing requirement until formally reviewed and lifted — not quietly reversed once the person who gave it has left the ship.
2. A watch handover during deteriorating weather, especially following a known prior dragging event that same night, needs an explicit instruction to actively monitor position, not a general handover assuming standard vigilance.
3. Anchor position needs active, frequent verification during marginal weather — nine minutes of undetected dragging is nine minutes where a developing collision risk goes unaddressed.
4. A sister vessel or nearby ship independently dragging anchor in the same conditions is a real, relevant warning sign for every vessel in the anchorage, worth actively sharing rather than treating as another ship's isolated problem.

Human Element Analysis

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Related Reading

• This week's regulatory roundup – including the American Club's own anchor-position ‘Good Catch’ bulletin, the same underlying risk