What Would You Do at Sea? MV Calobra Safety Lessons

Ruwais anchorage, UAE. 11 May 2025. 11:10 in the morning. The crew of the Maltese bulk carrier MV Calobra are preparing for berthing — opening cargo hold hatches, checking cargo spaces, running through the workplan circulated by the bosun earlier that morning. A routine pre-port day. Then an AB spots something on the main deck near hatch cover no. 4: a hydraulic oil leak at the starboard aft ram.

What happens over the next 25 minutes results in one crew member suffering 85% full-thickness burns to his body. He would spend months in hospital. The hydraulic pump was not running. No one had intended to start a fire. And yet the fire investigator from Malta's Marine Safety Investigation Unit (MSIU) would later conclude that the accident was entirely preventable — and that the decisions made on deck that morning were shaped not by malice, but by a gap in knowledge that no one on board had any reason to doubt.

This article walks through the incident step by step, asks what you would have done at each decision point, and explains what the MSIU investigation (Report 08/2026) found and recommended. It is one of the most important safety reads in recent years for any deck crew member — regardless of vessel type.

The Vessel and the Job

MV Calobra was a 23,872 GT Handymax bulk carrier, built in China in 2015, flagged to Malta, managed by V. Ships (Hamburg) GmbH. She carried a crew of 22 Indian nationals. The vessel was fitted with five cargo holds and MacGregor hydraulic end-folding hatch covers — a common design on bulk carriers worldwide.

A deck fitter, 51 years old and a qualified welder, had been specifically signed on in Türkiye six weeks earlier to address a known problem: multiple hydraulic oil leaks across the hatch cover hydraulic piping systems. This was not a surprise breakdown — it was a pre-planned maintenance job. The fitter's role was to find and fix those leaks while the vessel was at sea, with workshop fabrication work during port stays to avoid disrupting hatch cover operation.

The hydraulic system operated at up to 28 MPa — around 280 times atmospheric pressure. The oil in use was GulfSea Hydraulic HVI Plus 32. Its flash point: 219°C. Its autoignition temperature: above 300°C. Not flammable under normal conditions. That matters — because what happens next hinges almost entirely on a misunderstanding of what "not flammable under normal conditions" actually means.

Decision Point 1: A Leak Is Found

At approximately 11:10, an AB spots the oil leak near the starboard aft ram of hatch cover no. 4 and tells the bosun. The bosun informs the deck cadet. The deck cadet tells the chief officer. The chief officer walks to the cross deck to inspect. By the time he arrives, the crew are already spreading sawdust to contain the leak.

The chief officer, the bosun, and the fitter assess the situation. The flange bolts connecting a section of the hydraulic piping are seized — corroded solid. They cannot be shifted by hand. Two options are discussed: cold work (cutting the bolts mechanically) or heating the bolts with an oxy-acetylene torch to expand and free them.

The chief officer decides: heat the bolts. He also makes a statement to the crew present that would later be identified as the critical knowledge gap in this entire incident: "Hydraulic oil is not flammable."

Why That Statement Was Wrong — and Why Nobody Questioned It

Hydraulic oil with a flash point of 219°C is indeed not easily flammable in a liquid pool at ambient temperature. That is technically accurate. But it is dangerously incomplete.

When hydraulic oil is atomised, sprayed, or exposed to heat from a nearby flame, its behaviour changes completely. A pressurised leak spraying oil mist into a flammable atmosphere near an open flame is an entirely different hazard from a pool of oil sitting at room temperature. The MSIU investigation confirmed that the immediate area around the flange had already been contaminated with leaked oil — creating exactly the kind of flammable environment that the chief officer's statement did not account for.

Why did no one challenge this? The MSIU report addresses this directly. In hierarchical maritime environments, subordinates frequently do not question officers' technical statements, even when they have doubt. The fitter was an experienced welder. The bosun was an experienced seaman. Neither challenged the assessment. The MSIU concluded this represented a failure of the vessel's Stop Work Authority procedure — a right every crew member has to halt an operation they believe is unsafe.

Decision Point 2: The Chief Officer Goes to the Office

The chief officer directs the bosun to get the oxy-acetylene bottles on deck and to close the isolation valves to hatch cover no. 4. He informs the master of the plan. He assigns an OS to assist the fitter. And then — critically — he heads to the cargo office to prepare the risk assessment and Hot Work Permit.

The isolation valves are closed. The gas bottles come on deck. The sawdust used to contain the leak is moved aft. The fitter begins work.

The fitter lights the torch. Work begins without the Hot Work Permit being formally issued and without the risk assessment being completed. The MSIU described this as a gap between "intended process and practical execution" — not a wilful violation, but a drift where the administrative steps were expected to catch up with the physical work, rather than precede it.

What Happened Next

The fitter removes the first (upper) bolt without incident. He moves to the second, lower bolt. As he applies heat, a gap develops between the two flange mating faces. Pressurised hydraulic oil — whether from residual pressure, gravity backflow, or incomplete isolation — sprays from the open faces.

The oil contacts the flame.

It ignites immediately. Flames engulf the fitter. An AB on top of hatch cover no. 5 sees the fire, shouts "Fire," and climbs down. An OS presses the fire alarm. The time is approximately 11:35. The bosun pours a bucket of water on the fire to extinguish it.

The fitter is found severely burned — his clothing completely burned off — but conscious and able to speak. The master and chief engineer rush from the bridge. The second officer retrieves his walkie-talkie and goes to the ship's hospital. Cold water is applied to cool the burns. Oral rehydration solution is prepared. CIRM Rome is contacted remotely and medications administered. A sterile burn sheet covers the fitter.

At 12:53, a SAR helicopter lands on hatch cover no. 3. The fitter is transferred and airborne by 13:09 — 94 minutes after the fire alarm was raised. The emergency response was prompt and effective. The MSIU noted this as a genuine positive.

At hospital, the fitter was diagnosed with 85% total body surface area burns, the majority full-thickness (third degree), affecting his head, neck, face, arms, hands, and legs. He also suffered an inhalation injury. At the time the MSIU report was published, he was still receiving intensive specialist treatment.

What the Investigation Found

MSIU Safety Investigation Report 08/2026 identified eight conclusions:

1. The fire originated from leaking hydraulic oil igniting during thermal cutting of the seized bolts.
2. The protective clothing worn was not suited to the hazards of hot work.
3. Hot work began before formal safety controls (risk assessment and Hot Work Permit) were completed.
4. A belief that hydraulic oil was not flammable under the circumstances influenced risk perception — and went unchallenged.
5. No crew member enforced Stop Work Authority.
6. Perceived operational pressure (the need to be ready for berthing) shaped decisions and led to shortcuts.
7. Safety documentation was treated as administrative compliance, not as a risk-based decision tool.
8. The emergency response was prompt and effective.

The investigation also noted that the required port authority permit for hot work at Ruwais anchorage had not been sought. Under Petroleum Ports Authority regulations, any hot work within the anchorage required written authorisation submitted at least 24 hours in advance.

The Similar Case You Need to Know About

MV Calobra was not the first. On 5 June 2022, a deck fitter on MV Kiran Anatolia suffered fatal burns performing hot work on a leaking hydraulic pipe. The fire, caused by residual hydraulic oil igniting when flame was applied, engulfed the crew member, who jumped overboard. He was rescued but died from his injuries. The MSIU investigated that incident in Report 09/2023 and highlighted the same gaps: risk perception and pre-work hazard identification.

Three years later, the same accident happened again. Different vessel, different crew, same knowledge gap.

Key Safety Lessons for Every Seafarer

1. Hydraulic oil is not simply "not flammable"

Hydraulic oil with a high flash point is difficult to ignite in a pool at ambient temperature. But atomised, sprayed, or heated — particularly in the presence of an open flame — it becomes highly flammable. The contamination of the surrounding deck area with leaked oil before hot work began created a flammable environment that extended well beyond the flange faces. Any crew member working with hydraulic systems near ignition sources must understand this distinction.

2. Closing isolation valves is not the same as eliminating pressure

The isolation valves for hatch cover no. 4 were closed. The hydraulic pump was reportedly not running. And yet pressurised oil sprayed from the open flange faces when they parted. The MSIU could not conclusively exclude residual pressure or gravity-fed backflow. Proper energy isolation for hydraulic systems requires isolation and drainage, confirmed by pressure gauge reading at zero, before any work on open flanges. A job hazard analysis should have confirmed this.

3. The hot work permit process must precede the work — not follow it

The permit-to-work system exists to force a systematic review of hazards before work starts. When work begins before the permit is issued, the review either never happens or happens retrospectively — at which point it is essentially rubber-stamping what has already been decided. In this case, the chief officer had already concluded the job was low-risk (based on the incorrect belief about hydraulic oil flammability), which would have shaped any subsequent risk assessment regardless.

4. PPE must match the actual hazard

The fitter's protective clothing was not flame-retardant and was not rated for hot work. For any job involving an open flame near a potential source of flammable fluid, FR (flame-retardant) coveralls, a face shield, and leather gloves at minimum are required. The absence of appropriate PPE directly increased the severity of the injuries sustained.

5. Your Stop Work Authority is real — use it

Every seafarer on a vessel with an SMS has the right to stop work they believe is unsafe. It is not insubordination. It is a formal, protected right. On MV Calobra, experienced crew members heard a senior officer say something technically incorrect about the flammability of hydraulic oil, and none of them challenged it. The result was catastrophic. If something does not feel right — a statement about a hazard, a missing permit, work starting too soon — you have the authority to say so.

MSIU Recommendations

The MSIU issued four recommendations to V. Ships (Hamburg):

• R1: Deliver targeted training on hydraulic fluid fire risks to all deck officers and engineers, using this report and MSIU 09/2023 as case studies.
• R2: Ensure the chief engineer is involved in all hydraulic and similar systems requiring energy isolation planning, as part of the job hazard analysis.
• R3: Strengthen Hot Work Permit and Permit to Work processes through scenario-based training.
• R4: Reinforce Stop Work Authority through leadership workshops and onboard drills.

What Would You Have Done?

Go back through the decision points in this article. At each one, the right answer in hindsight is obvious. In the moment, under operational pressure, with a senior officer making a confident technical statement, surrounded by colleagues who are not raising objections — the right answer is harder to act on.

That is exactly why maritime safety investigations exist. Not to assign blame, but to make the right answer easier to reach the next time. Read Report 08/2026. Discuss it with your crew. If your vessel operates hydraulic deck machinery, ask your chief officer what the energy isolation procedure is before work starts — and verify the pressure gauge reads zero before any flange is opened near a heat source.

The fitter on MV Calobra was experienced, qualified, and did his job as instructed. The system around him failed. Make sure the system around you works.

Source: MSIU Safety Investigation Report No. 08/2026 — MV Calobra, Serious burn injuries to a crew member during hot work on deck at Ruwais anchorage, UAE, 11 May 2025.