Eight Hours, No Steering, and a Backup System Nobody Was Trained to Use

The Rudders Locked Hard to Port, and Stayed There

Late on 23 July 2025, the 44.6-metre mixed cargo vessel Matthew Flinders III was underway from Bridport, Tasmania, to Lady Barron on Flinders Island, carrying fertiliser and agricultural machinery. About four nautical miles north of Waterhouse Island, in moderate seas, an autopilot alarm sounded. The rudders had locked hard to port. The vessel swung into an uncontrolled turn.

What ATSB Found

The investigation traced the fault to a loose linkage arm on the rudder angle sensor. Once it worked loose, the autopilot system lost rudder angle feedback entirely — disabling both the autopilot and the follow-up manual steering mode that would normally have let the OOW regain control by hand. The crew reduced engine power and the chief engineer engaged the vessel's non-follow-up “toggle steering” backup system in an attempt to reinstate rudder control.

Here's the part that matters most: ATSB confirmed the toggle steering system was available and functional throughout the entire incident. The problem wasn't that the backup didn't work. The problem was that the Master had not been adequately trained on how to operate it — and the investigation found the gap went deeper than one officer's individual knowledge. There were no instructions displayed on the bridge for the toggle steering system, and the controls themselves weren't labelled. On top of that, the vessel's own manuals actually advised using differential thrust rather than the backup steering system in an emergency — meaning the crew's initial reliance on engine power instead of toggle steering was following documented company guidance, not improvising around it. A working system that no one is told to trust, with no instructions posted and no labels on the controls, might as well not be there.

It took roughly eight hours before the chief engineer located the loose linkage arm on the rudder angle sensor, tightened the securing grub screws, and restored normal steering. The vessel resumed its voyage to Lady Barron without further incident. No injuries. No pollution. No damage beyond the fault itself.

Why a Clean Outcome Still Deserves Full Attention

ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell was direct about it: the toggle steering system was available and was engaged by the engineer in the attempt to reinstate rudder control — but the company's broader emergency steering procedures and Safety Management System still needed improvement. ATSB issued a formal safety recommendation on exactly that point. This is the case that proves a near-miss with no casualties can still expose a real gap: eight hours without reliable steering, in Bass Strait, is eight hours of genuine risk that simply didn't turn into a casualty this time.

Recommended Actions

1. Formal ATSB safety recommendation: further improvements to the company's emergency steering procedures and Safety Management System
2. Confirm which officers are actually trained and drilled on the vessel's specific non-follow-up/toggle steering system — not just aware it exists
3. Run backup steering drills as scheduled exercises with a debrief, the same as fire or abandon-ship drills, rather than a one-time handover briefing
4. Review SMS documentation to specify training currency requirements for emergency and backup steering modes by name
5. Check that emergency manuals don't actively steer crew away from a functional backup system — the investigation found the vessel's own manuals recommended differential thrust over toggle steering, which needs correcting alongside the training gap
6. Fit clear operating instructions at the toggle steering position on the bridge, and label the controls themselves — neither existed at the time of the incident

Human Element Analysis

How This Pattern Repeats

See How You'd Handle It

The scenario opens the moment the autopilot alarm sounds and the rudders lock hard to port. Do you know, right now, which backup steering mode your own vessel has — and have you actually operated it? Six decision points follow the eight-hour fault-finding process to its resolution.

What Every Crew Should Take From This

• Knowing a backup system exists is not the same as being trained to operate it under pressure — confirm every officer who might need it has actually practised using it
• A mechanical fault in a small linkage arm can disable both primary and follow-up steering simultaneously — know your steering system's single points of failure
• Emergency steering drills should be run as genuine drills, not just briefings — the difference shows up exactly when a real fault occurs
• Eight hours without full steering control is a serious event regardless of whether it results in injury, pollution, or damage — treat near-misses with the same scrutiny as casualties
• Review your own vessel's SMS: does it specify who is trained on backup steering, and when that training was last practised?

Related Reading

• The Alarm Is Not the Emergency — another case where the real risk developed after the first alarm sounded
• Heavy Weather Ship Handling — steering casualties in moderate-to-heavy seas carry compounding risk
• Flooding Under Tow — another case where technical knowledge gaps under pressure shaped the outcome