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Three Men Died. What Went Wrong — And Could It Happen On Your Watch?

🕑 5 min read words News

At 05:30 on 8 December 2022, Three Men Died

A 126-metre ro-ro cargo vessel struck an 18-metre fishing trawler off the coast of Jersey. The fishing boat sank immediately. Skipper Michael Michieli, 62, and crewmen Larry Simyunn, 33, and Jervis Baligat, 31 drowned. The investigation report, held back for over three years pending criminal proceedings, was published in June 2026. One officer was convicted and jailed for 20 months.

But the real question for every officer reading this is not what happened to him. It’s whether any of the conditions that led to this collision exist on your bridge right now.

What Happened

The Commodore Goodwill was approaching Jersey in the early hours, on autopilot, with two crew on the bridge. The ro-ro freighter was in a close-quarters situation with the fishing vessel L’Ecume II. Both vessels made course alterations — but they were too small and too late to prevent a collision.

Failure 1: Inadequate Lookout

The designated lookout had been sent to breakfast and had only recently returned to the bridge before the collision. Critically, even when back on the bridge, he was not properly integrated into the bridge team — he was tasked with pre-arrival checks instead of performing his primary duty of keeping a visual watch. The investigation found that removing or reassigning lookouts had become “normalised” across fleets worldwide, and described it as “a recurrent factor in investigations into collisions and groundings.”

Failure 2: Insufficient Course Alterations

The officer of the watch made only small alterations of course, apparently believing these were sufficient to pass the fishing vessel at a safe distance. They were not. Under Rule 16 of COLREGS, a vessel required to give way must take early and substantial action. Small, hesitant alterations are not only insufficient — they can confuse the other vessel and worsen the situation.

Failure 3: Fatigue

The crew had recently shifted to a “rolling eights” watch system — eight hours on, eight hours off. The investigation found this arrangement did not meet minimum rest requirements in any 24-hour period. At the time of the collision, the watchkeeping officer’s attention was statistically five times more likely to lapse due to sleep deprivation. Fatigue was assessed as a probable significant contributing factor.

Failure 4: Skipper Absent from the Wheelhouse

The skipper of L’Ecume II was almost certainly not in the wheelhouse at the time of collision. He was most likely below deck attempting to fix an electrical fault in the generator room — leaving no certificated watchkeeper on the bridge. The fishing vessel made an unexplained course alteration two minutes before impact, 36 seconds after the Commodore Goodwill had herself altered course — creating a deadly convergence that neither vessel could recover from.

What Could Have Prevented It

A fully attentive, fully integrated lookout on the bridge at all times — not assigned to pre-arrival tasks
Bold and early COLREGS-compliant course alterations — not small adjustments
A watchkeeping schedule that genuinely met minimum rest requirements, not one that appeared compliant on paper
The skipper of L’Ecume II remaining on the bridge or ensuring a competent watchkeeper was present
A bridge culture where any crew member felt empowered to challenge the officer’s decisions

The Questions Every Watchkeeper Should Be Asking Right Now

When did you last honestly ask yourself: am I too tired to keep an effective watch right now?
Is your lookout actually looking out — or are they doing something else while standing on the bridge?
If you were in a developing close-quarters situation right now, would your first instinct be to make a bold alteration or a small one?
Could you accurately describe the rest hours your bridge team has had in the last 24 hours?
Has anything on your ship been “normalised” that you know, deep down, doesn’t meet the standard?

The Regulatory Framework Behind This Incident

COLREGS Rule 5 — Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing
COLREGS Rule 8 — Any action to avoid collision must be large enough to be readily apparent to the other vessel
COLREGS Rule 16 — The give-way vessel shall take early and substantial action to keep well clear
STCW Table A-VIII/1 — Minimum rest periods: 10 hours in any 24-hour period, 77 hours in any 7-day period
ISM Code — Masters must be empowered to make decisions with respect to safety

Pull out your rest hour records right now. Not the paperwork — the reality. Then ask your team: is our lookout actually watching? The next time you are in a developing close-quarters situation, remember Michael Michieli, Larry Simyunn, and Jervis Baligat. Make the bold alteration. Make it early. Make it obvious.